The Death of Contracts by Snyder, Franklin G. & Mirabito, Ann M.
Texas A&M University School of Law
Texas A&M Law Scholarship
Faculty Scholarship
2014
The Death of Contracts
Franklin G. Snyder
Texas A&M University School of Law, fsnyder@law.tamu.edu
Ann M. Mirabito
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/facscholar
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Texas A&M Law Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an
authorized administrator of Texas A&M Law Scholarship. For more information, please contact aretteen@law.tamu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Franklin G. Snyder & Ann M. Mirabito, The Death of Contracts, 52 Duq. L. Rev. 345 (2014).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/facscholar/68
The Death of Contracts
Franklin G. Snyder & Ann M. Mirabito*
INTRODUCTION ............................. ....... 346
I. CONTRACT LAW AS TECHNOLOGY...... .......... 350
II. THE STRUCTURAL TECHNIQUE OF CONTRACT LAW...... 353
III. THE RULE TECHNIQUE OF CONTRACT LAW.................. 357
A. Development of Contract Rule Technique........ 359
B. Contract Rule Technique in Contemporary
America .............................. 365
1. The Fragmentation of Contract
Technique.......................366
2. The Elements of Contract Rule
Technique................ ....... 367
IV. THE WORLD AS REFLECTED IN CONTRACT LAW
TECHNIQUE ............................ ..... 376
A. The World Reflected in Structural Technique. 376
B. The World Reflected in Rule Technique........... 377
V. THE WORLD AS IT (REALLY) Is............ ............... 381
A. Structural Technique .................... 381
B. Rule Technique. ......................... 384
C. The Shape of Things to Come ... ............ 394
VI. IMPLICATIONS FOR "CONTRACTS" AS A SUBJECT .......... 398
A. Consideration .................. ........ 399
B. Reliance ......................... ..... 400
C. Formation. ....................... ...... 401
D. Writing Requirements .............. ..... 404
E. Defenses ........................ ...... 405
F. Interpretation ...................... 407
G. Performance and Breach.............. ........ 408
1. Substantial Performance . .......... 408
2. Impracticability and Frustration......... 409
H. Capacity ......................... ..... 410
* The authors are, respectively Professor of Law, Texas A&M University School of
Law, and Associate Professor of Marketing, Hankamer School of Business, Baylor Universi-
ty. We are grateful to the editors of Duquesne Law Review with particular gratitude to
Symposium Editor Paul Roman and Editor-in-Chief James Doring for their invitation to
participate in this Symposium in honor of Dr. John Murray and their excellent editorial
work.
345
Duquesne Law Review
I. Damages........................... 411
CONCLUSION ................................... 411
INTRODUCTION
In 1897, writer Mark Twain read a newspaper account that re-
ported that he had become seriously ill and died. In response, he
wrote the New York Journal, "The report of my death was an ex-
aggeration."' The response caused a good deal of humor at the
time, and it is a joke so good that it is still quoted today. But
Twain, at the time, was sixty-two years old, in deep depression,
and frequently ill.2 Nearly all of his best work was behind him.
He went on to live for another thirteen years, and even wrote at
least two highly acclaimed pieces-The Man Who Corrupted Had-
leyburg comes to mind-but he was already on the downhill slope.
The Journal's only mistake was in being premature.
In 1974, Grant Gilmore created something of a tempest in the
world of contract law scholarship with the publication of The
Death of Contract.4 "We are told that Contract, like God, is dead,"'
he wrote. "And so it is."' The book was derived from a series of
lectures Gilmore had given in 1970. The lectures and the book
were developed against the background of the legal revolution of
the 1960s, with the Warren Court,' the rise of class action litiga-
tion,8 the vast court-wrought revolution in products liability,9 the
rise of promissory estoppel'o as an alternative to contract, and
even court-ordered busing for desegregation." This was the zen-
ith of enthusiasm for the idea that creative, idealistic lawyers and
1. 2 MARK TWAIN, AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF MARK TWAIN 11 (Benjamin Griffin et al. eds.,
2013).
2. See RON POWERS, MARK TWAIN: A LIFE 563-98 (2005).
3. Reprinted in THE MAN THAT CORRUPTED HADLEYBURG, AND OTHER STORIES AND
ESSAYS (Oxford Mark Twain 1996) (1899).
4. GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (1974).
5. Id. at 1.
6. Id.
7. See generally MORTON J. HORwITz, THE WARREN COURT AND THE PURSUIT OF
JUSTICE: A CRITICAL ISSUE (1998).
8. See generally Stephen C. Yeazell, Group Litigation and Social Context: Toward a
History of the Class Action, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 866 (1977).
9. See generally PETER W. HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS
CONSEQUENCES (1990).
10. The doctrine at its zenith was enshrined in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 90 (1981).
11. See generally CHARLES T. CLOTFELTER, AFTER BROWN: THE RISE AND RETREAT OF
SCHOOL DESEGREGATION (2004).
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disinterested, legally expert judges-relying on the work of bril-
liant, cutting-edge legal academics-could solve even the bitterest
social problems through litigation in the courts. That thinking is
apparent in Gilmore's arguments. After all, the losses caused by a
breach of a contract can in some cases dwarf the losses caused by
even the most egregious torts,1 2 and in each case the responsible
party is made to pay for the losses. Why should contract be treat-
ed differently than any other area of law in which injured people
are compensated? The nineteenth century insistence on "the
agreement," "consent," and "the intent of the parties," and the pe-
culiar set of doctrines that embodied them, was out of date. Gil-
more theorized that "Contract"-by which he meant classical
American contract common law and its assorted doctrines-would
be "reabsorbed" into the common law of torts,1 3 and that the judg-
es who had done so much to alter and extend tort law to create
massive new areas of liability 4 would wash away the doctrinal
detritus and dictate a new and improved approach to contractual
liability.
As things turned out, Gilmore's funeral oration for contract law
was about as accurate as the Journal's report of Twain's death.
The enthusiasm for judicial revolutions was already starting to
wane, and hardly survived the 1970s. State courts that had
shown some early infatuation with reliance-based theories began
to move away from them. Observers noted that courts were be-
coming even more doctrinaire in their allegiance to classical con-
tract theory." Reliance as an alternative to the traditional bar-
12. See, e.g., Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 729 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987), cert.
dismissed, 485 U.S. 994 (1988) (affirming award of $7.53 billion for interference with a
merger contract).
13. GILMORE, supra note 4, at 95.
14. The period saw the invention of strict liability for manufacturers of products, the
decline of venerable defenses like contributory negligence and assumption of risk, and the
invention of the modern class action lawsuit. There was considerable enthusiasm for these
developments at the time, but a half-century later opinions are less favorable. See, e.g.
ERIC HELLAND & ALEXANDER TABARROK, JUDGE AND JURY: AMERICAN TORT LAW ON
TRIAL1-22 (2006) (noting "explosion" of tort liability since 1970 has doubled the percentage
of GDP devoted to tort litigation).
15. See, e.g., THE FALL AND RISE OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT (F.H. Buckley ed. 1999);
Jay M. Feinman, Un-Making Law: The Classical Revival in the Common Law, 28 SEATTLE
UNIV. L. REV. 1 (2004); Jean Braucher, The Afterlife of Contract, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 49
(1995); Catherine L. Fisk, Lochner Redux: The Renaissance of Laissez-Faire Contract in the
Federal Common Law of Employee Benefits, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 153 (1995).
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gain theory of contract seemed to wither almost into desuetude."
On the surface, at least, contract law was very much alive.
But Gilmore, like the New York Journal, was merely prema-
ture. "Contract" in 1974, like Mark Twain in 1897, was old, sick,
and unlikely to burst back into full youthful vigor. It had a few
good decades left, but, like the ageing writer, it was on the down-
hill slope. There were important cases and doctrinal innovations
still to come, as a quick perusal of any contemporary contract law
casebook will show. Just as with the old codger who everybody
recognizes is still an inventive writer and humorist, the handwrit-
ing is already there on the wall.
Our thesis here is that contract law as a distinct, coherent, and
important body of law-the law generated through the appellate
decisions of American courts and taught in American law schools
for nearly a century and a half-is dying. The last few decades
have seen a steady erosion of its importance, and it functions to-
day less as a tool that enables a rich vein of private ordering than
as a series of arbitrary traps that lie in wait for the unwary. Be-
cause sophisticated commercial parties are always free to opt out
of contract regimes they do not find helpful, 7 much of the current
law school contracts course, in our view, is likely to become almost
entirely irrelevant to practicing lawyers and their clients. And in
a world in which most law schools will face considerable pressure
to adapt their curricula to meet the needs of the profession and
the clients, it will become, for all practical purposes, dead."
Our argument rests upon general observations of the disconnec-
tions between the structure of contract law and the realities of
16. The extent of its decline is a matter of some debate, but all seem to agree that it has
made little progress since 1980 and has been relatively unsuccessful in the courts. See
Robert A. Hillman, Questioning the "New Consensus" on Promissory Estoppel: An Empirical
and Theoretical Study, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 580 (1998); Charles L. Knapp, Rescuing Reliance:
The Perils of Promissory Estoppel, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 1191 (1998). It also seems that to the
extent "promissory estoppel" claims find success, enforcement seems to be based not on
Gilmore's tort-based reliance theory, but on a version of contract-based promise. See Juliet
P. Kostritsky, The Rise and Fall of Promissory Estoppel or Is Promissory Estoppel Really as
Unsuccessful as Scholars Say It Is: A New Look at the Data, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 531
(2002).
17. See JONATHAN MORGAN, CONTRACT LAW MINIMALISM 87-88 (2013).
18. Another article predicting the demise of contracts is Robert E. Scott, The Death of
Contract Law, 54 U. TORONTO L.J. 369 (2004). Professor Scott accurately points out the
problems caused by the consistent push of judges and legal scholars to turn informal norms
of fairness and cooperation into binding legal obligations, and suggests that sophisticated
parties may opt to bifurcate commercial relationships in such a way that only a portion of
the relationship is subject to legal enforcement. We believe this is entirely consistent with
the broader argument we are making here.
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modem commercial transactions. Most of these observations, we
believe, are not controversial, although the conclusions we draw
probably will be so. We begin with the insight that the processes
and rules humans use to carry out commercial transactions and to
resolve disputes over those transactions are technologies,"9 or,
more precisely, as we will call them here techniques,20 the materi-
als and processes of problem-solving. Like other techniques, these
processes are subject to becoming outdated by changes in the
world that make them less effective. That legal rules of contract
become "outdated" and must be revised in light of current needs
was, in fact, a principal argument made by the Legal Realist con-
tracts professor Karl Llewellyn,2 1 and is nearly a truism today.
Thus, contract law has regularly been "updated," most notably by
adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code in the 1960s. But, we
argue, contract law's adaption over the last century and a half has
been mostly tinkering with a basic offering, and so contract law
has become less and less valuable to contracting parties them-
selves and less and less important to those (government actors,
primarily) who would regulate those transactions.
The argument here will proceed in six steps. In Part I we ex-
plore in more detail the idea of law as technique. We then exam-
ine two interrelated strands of technique, the judicial structure for
resolving disputes (Part II), and the body of legal rules that govern
contract disputes (Part III). In Part IV we look at current contract
law technique and ask, "What kind of world does this technique
seem to assume exists, and for what kind of world does it seem
appropriate?" Part V then examines how closely the world implied
in current technique matches the world that actually exists today
and that we will likely see in the future. We find that contract law
as we think of it today corresponds very little with the actual
19. In modern international trade, for example, such legal constructs as irrevocable
letters of credit, policies of marine insurance, negotiable bills of lading, and force majeure
clauses are as much "technologies" in the broad sense, as the ships, trains, trucks, and
planes that carry the goods. They are tools developed to help humans solve the problems of
moving goods from one place to another in the most efficient manner.
20. We explain the use of the term in part I, infra.
21. See, e.g., Karl Llewellyn, Across Sales on Horseback, 52 HARV. L. REV. 725, 728-36
(1939); Zipporah Batshaw Wiseman, The Limits of Vision: Karl Llewellyn and the Merchant
Rules, 100 HARV. L. REV. 465, 468 n.13 (1987). Llewellyn often tended to use "outdated" to
describe rules he really meant were socially undesirable on other grounds, see Franklin G.
Snyder, Clouds of Mystery, Dispelling the Realist Rhetoric of the Uniform Commercial Code,
68 OHIO ST. L.J. 11 (2007) (critiquing Llewellyn's version of Legal Realism as applied to his
work on the UCC), but that he realized the power of "outdated" as a criticism only rein-
forced the point.
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world of today, and even less so with that of the future. Finally,
Part VI looks at the body of contract law as taught in the standard
law school course on the subject and explains why, in our view,
most of it is doomed to practical irrelevance.
I. CONTRACT LAW AS TECHNOLOGY
All human societies have "law" in its broad sense: a set of norms
that are generally regarded as binding by members of the society
and which cannot be transgressed without being subject to some
penalty. Law is a human artifact.22 The precise artifact we call
"law," like the artifact we call "agriculture," varies widely across
time and space. "Law," like "agriculture," is simply the general
term we apply to a specific set of functions carried out in a society.
Like all such functions, the legal function varies depending on: (a)
the knowledge available to that society, (b) the specific needs of the
given society, and (c) the degree of infrastructure available to
translate the knowledge into a solution to the need.23 Just as a
society's agricultural techniques are the way it solves particular
food production problems at particular times, the law techniques
society uses for dispute resolution are also developed at particular
times for particular situations.
We use the term "technique" rather than "technology" because,
in English usage, the latter has come to connote the practical use
of applied science, progressive improvement, and often a specific
business sector, the "technology industry."24 Moreover, the French
22. See H.L.A. Hart, Bentham and the Demystification of Law, 36 MODERN L. REV. 2
(1961), reprinted in H.L.A. HART, ESSAYS ON BENTHAM (1982).
23. For example, we can assume that the cultivation of grain is a technology superior to
that of traditional hunting and gathering. But a given society will not be able to deploy the
cultivation technology if it is ignorant of it. It will have no motive to adopt it, even if it has
the knowledge, if it is living in an area where food is already abundant. And it will not
adopt the cultivation technology, even if it has the knowledge and would like to do so, if the
natural environment and its available social structures (such systems for coordinating work
and keeping rival tribes away from the harvest) prevent the society from doing so.
24. This was not always the case. The term "technology"-derived etymologically from
the Greek logos (discourse) and tekhne (skill or art)-became a cultural keyword during the
Second Industrial Revolution of the mid- to late nineteenth and the early twentieth centu-
ries. In contemporary American usage, the term is often related to applied science and
frequently implies the progressive improvement born of the late nineteenth century idea
that modern history is a record of progress. In English, "technology" originally referred
merely to the study of the industrial arts or the useful arts, a usage that was exemplified in
the naming of Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1861. The English meaning of
technology expanded around 1930 to include not only the study of the useful arts (Technol-
ogie, in German) but also the object of the study, that is, the materials and processes of
problem solving (Technik). While the two terms were distinct in German, American social
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philosopher, sociologist, and law professor Jacques Ellul has to
some extent popularized the term "technique" with respect to the
legal system.2 5 Ellul uses "technique" to describe "any method
adopted by humans to achieve a goal more efficiently in any field
of human activity," including "not only physical artifacts, but also
methods and organizational structures, among other things."26
This definition clearly encompasses the body of rules, processes,
and systems that we call "contracts."
Contract law technique in the United States is, in fact, made up
of at least two different techniques, which work together to form
the whole. It is made up of (a) a particular set of rules and princi-
ples for decision-making that are (b) carried out through a particu-
lar bureaucratic apparatus, the court system. Contract disputes
make up only one relatively small part of the work done by the
court system. The court system is a technique designed to process
a vast range of disputes, while the rules of contract law are a
technique that governs decision-making by the court system in a
particular range of cases. To use an inexact metaphor, the Ameri-
can legal system resembles a computer system that uses both
hardware and software to achieve its results. The basic hardware
technology remains the same even though different software pro-
grams (themselves technological products) are used to do different
things. Similarly, the same software may run on different kinds of
hardware. Hardware and software are always to some extent in-
tertwined and interdependent, but they are different things.
thinkers, most notably Thorstein Veblen, fused the two meanings into the single term tech-
nology. See Eric Schatzberg, "Technik" Comes to America: Changing Meanings of "Technol-
ogy" before 1930, 47 TECH. & CULTURE 486 (2006); see also RUTH OLDENZIEL, MAKING
TECHNOLOGY MASCULINE 19-50 (1999).
Sociologists trace the enthusiasm for the concepts of Technik and Technologie to
German engineers who sought to distinguish their work from ordinary mechanical labor.
Leo Marx notes that practical arts have been inferior to fine arts since antiquity, with dis-
tinctions made between objects and ideas, the physical and the mental, the enslaved and
free thinkers. During industrialization, the mechanical arts were evidenced in the locomo-
tive, the steam engine, the water mill-important agents of social change and more ab-
stract than traditional artisanal work. German engineers pointed to the creative character
of invention, blurring the distinction between Technik and Kultur. See Leo Marx, Does
Improved Technology Mean Progress?, 90 TECH. REV. 33 (1987), reprinted in TECHNOLOGY
AND THE FUTURE (Albert H. Heich ed., 2006).
25. See JACQUES ELLUL, THE TECHNOLOGICAL SOCIETY xxv (John Wilkinson trans.
1964); JACQUES ELLUL, THE THEOLOGICAL FOUNDATION OF LAW (Marguerite Wieser trans.
1960).
26. Jennifer A. Chandler, Technological Self-Help and Equality in Cyberspace, 56
McGILL L.J. 39, 48 (2010).
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We see the same in law, where systems in different societies
that are procedurally similar may operate under very different
rules, while the same basic rules may be deployed in other socie-
ties through very different procedures. Hence we will draw a dis-
tinction between the technique of the decision-making system it-
self (the people, resources, and procedures involved), which we will
call here structural technique, and the mental constructs (the body
of legal rules) used by the structure to arrive at results, which we
call rule technique. Both structural and rule technique are driven
primarily by the perceived needs of the society in which they are
embedded, and they may influence each other. A society may dic-
tate certain rules to which the structure must necessarily conform
(for example, the American constitutional requirement of jury tri-
als27 ), while the structure may drive rule technique to make the
structure more efficient or to remedy some of the structure's per-
ceived flaws.28
Changes to structural technique tend to be driven primarily by
efforts to improve efficiency. A court system, like other functional
human systems, tends to have efficiency (broadly defined) as one
of its principal aims. We say "broadly defined" because the goals
of its designers may range from efficiently administering justice to
efficiently liquidating enemies of the ruling regime.2 9 Potential
improvements in structural technique are traded off with their
potential costs. Changes to structure tend to be justified by the
fact that they improve the processes, without regard to the partic-
ular rules being applied. Thus, most of the developments in Amer-
ican structural technique in the last hundred years have been jus-
tified as improving the fairness and accuracy of the proceedings.so
27. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
28. Thus, the constitutional requirement of a jury in the federal and many state consti-
tutions requires that structural technique incorporate it, even if the jury system is ineffi-
cient. The use of the jury may then force the rule technique to develop means of limiting
the perceived problems with juries through rules removing decisions from juries (such as
the meaning of a given contract), or putting limits on their range of decision-making (such
as the measure of damages for breach), and by rules preventing certain kinds of evidence
from reaching them (such as restrictions on parol evidence).
29. Or even, as some have charged, to enhance the power and wealth of those who
control and manipulate the system, a charge frequently made by critics regarding the
American legal system. See, e.g., WALTER K. OLSON, THE RULE OF LAWYERS: HOW THE NEW
LITIGATION ELITE THREATENS AMERICA'S RULE OF LAW (2004). An excellent and temperate
scholarly look at the way lawyers and judges benefit from operating the system is
BENJAMIN H. BARTON, THE LAWYER-JUDGE BIAS IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM (2010).
30. Thus, pretrial discovery was urged as a reform that would end the kind of trial-by-
surprise that had previously been common; non-unanimous juries were designed to avoid
Vol. 52352
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The results of these changes may not in fact result in greater effi-
ciency, because changes to one part of a complex system often
have unintended results in other parts, but the goal is still, broad-
ly speaking, to make the process as efficient as possible.
Changes to rule technique, on the other hand, are driven by
many competing factors. In the area of Contracts, for example,
societies vary greatly in the extent to which private individuals
have autonomy to shape their own commercial relationships.
Some very complex societies that engage in substantial domestic
and international trade-such as the Babylon of Hammurabi's
time31-leave relatively little scope for parties to make and enforce
their own idiosyncratic bargains, while others-America in the
decades after the Civil War, for example 32-follow a laissez-faire
approach that gives the parties vast autonomy to shape deals and
have them enforced by the state. The social ethos shapes the ap-
propriate contract law technique. Thus, rule technique constructs
like "intent of the parties" in interpreting a promise might be criti-
cal in nineteenth century America, but presumably would hardly
even be comprehensible in the Babylon of the eighteenth century
B.C.
Tracing the development of structural and rule technique in the
United States is far beyond the scope of this paper. But because
our focus is on the death of that particular system called contracts
in contemporary America, we will outline current aspects of both
the structural and the rules techniques, with a few background
notes on how these developed.
II. THE STRUCTURAL TECHNIQUE OF CONTRACT LAW
As noted above, the structural technique of law in any society is
dependent upon the knowledge, needs, and infrastructure of the
particular society. The earliest English jurors, for example, were
members of the community who knew the parties and already
costs of relitigation; class actions were developed to permit more cost-effective resolution of
claims that otherwise would be too small to warrant litigation.
31. Babylonian commercial law went into great detail as to the forms of agreements
and specifies rules down to the level of fixing prices and mandatory terms for simple trans-
actions such as leases and shipments and complicated ventures like caravans to distant
markets. See generally C. W. JOHNS, BABYLONIAN AND ASSYRIAN LAWS, CONTRACTS AND
LETTERS 227-86 (1904) (outlining aspects of sales, loans, wages, guarantees, leases, trans-
portation, and trade).
32. See generally KEVIN M. TEVEEN, A HISTORY OF THE ANGLO-AMERICAN COMMON LAW
OF CONTRACT 175-216 (1990).
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knew the facts." This was doubtless a very efficient system in a
heavily localized world with poor transportation and communica-
tion systems and a fixed social structure. Jurors could rely on a
set of virtually immutable norms widely shared by the whole
community.
As transportation improved, communities grew larger and more
interconnected. Status became more ambiguous, and disputes
between members of different communities became more common.
The parochialism of the old system became increasingly apparent
and troublesome. As it happened, however, the improvements in
transportation and communications that made the world more
interconnected and fostered more disputes also promoted the crea-
tion of a more centralized procedure. Improvements in bureau-
cratic technique under the Plantagenet kings meant that courts
could develop consistent and coordinated processes, in which trials
could be conducted at a distance from the particular community by
royal judges who made regular circuits. These "assizes," which
required judges to spend time each year both in the capital and in
the hinterlands, allowed for an interchange of experiences. It also
led to the rise in London of a group of paid legal specialists known
as "serjeants-at-law," who enabled parties to rely on professionals
to plead their cases. This in turn drove the serjeants and the
judges to become more systematic and professional, developing a
body of specialized knowledge that would become valuable to cli-
ents. The modem English judicial system, ancestor to our own,
was born.
A striking feature of that system, largely carried down to the
American judicial system, was that legal matters of any sort were
addressed by a structural technique that used standardized forms
and processes. Central to this process was the jury, one of the
unique features of legal systems based on English law. A dispute
between two farmers over a cow and a prosecution for murder
were different matters, but each passed through the same tribu-
nals in much the same way. Every cause of action had to be cut
to the Procrustean bed34 of the system.35 Although from time to
33. This necessarily brief caricature of the early judicial procedures is taken from
FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW
BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD 1 (2 vol., 2d ed. 1898).
34. A Procrustean bed is a uniform standard arbitrarily imposed on a system.
MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 927 (10th ed. 2001). It is derived from the
name of the legendary Greek bandit Procrustes, who "had an iron bedstead, on which he
used to tie all travellers who fell into his hands. If they were shorter than the bed, he
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time it was suggested that the handling of commercial law dis-
putes might be better effected through some other procedure,"
that step was never taken. Thus in contemporary America, the
process for resolving contract disputes is virtually identical to that
used in resolving disputes in most other areas of law. A contract
claim is processed through the system in much the same way as
claims for antitrust, employment discrimination, negligent opera-
tion of a motor vehicle, or any other private cause of action.
The process generally works this way. When a contract dispute
arises, the services of a state or federal court are invoked to re-
solve it. Each party hires a lawyer or lawyers to represent it in
court. The plaintiffs lawyer files a written complaint with the
court," which sets forth the claim, followed by service of process
on the defendant, and then an answer filed by the defendant in
similar form, denying the claim and setting forth defenses." The
matter is assigned to a judge, a government employee trained as a
lawyer who has been appointed or elected to the office, and who is
usually a generalist without detailed knowledge of the area of law
that the claim entails. Upon motion of either party, the judge will
review each claim or defense for legal sufficiency." If the plead-
ings are sufficient, there is a period of delay, during which the
parties investigate and prepare their cases. The chief innovation
of the twentieth century in the American version of the process is
formal discovery, which takes place at this point and involves ex-
changes of written interrogatories, requests for admission, and
stretched their limbs to make them fit it; if they were longer than the bed, he lopped off a
portion." THOMAS BULFINCH, BULFINCH'S MYTHOLOGY 137 (Richard P. Martin ed., 1991).
35. Under the constraints of the day, this was entirely natural. There were not enough
judges or lawyers to allow for specialization, and the necessary bureaucratic technology
allowing organizations to chart different paths for different matters and to keep tabs on all
of them was lacking. Over time, English courts did develop some specialization by the
simple expedient of having different court systems compete with each other. Thus, the
Courts of Kings Bench, Common Pleas, and Exchequer, and later the Court of Chancery,
each developed its own procedures and its own specialties. Interestingly, however, this
specialization never took hold in the United States, where the same tribunals (state and
federal trial courts) exercised jurisdiction over all types of claims. The system became even
less specialized after the merger of law and equity in the latter part of the nineteenth cen-
tury.
36. Most notably, by Lord Chief Justice Mansfield in the 18th century, who advocated
using juries of merchants rather than laymen. See 1 JAMES OLDHAM, THE MANSFIELD
MANUSCRIPTS AND THE GROWTH OF ENGLISH LAW IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 93-99
(1992).
37. See FED. R. CIV. P. 3 (Commencing an Action).
38. See FED. R. Civ. P. 8(b)-(c) (Defenses; Affirmative Defenses); FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)
(How to Present Defenses).
39. See FED. R. CIV. P. 7 (Pleadings Allowed; Form of Motions and Other Papers).
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formal depositions of witnesses.40 During this period, various
written motions may be submitted by the parties' lawyers to re-
solve certain matters before trial; these are ruled on by the
judge.4 ' All of this takes a great deal of time and a substantial
amount of money. There may follow settlement discussions, often
under pressure imposed by the judge.42 A trial date is set, but
may be moved several times at the convenience of the judge, who
may often schedule several trials on the same day in the expecta-
tion that most or all will settle.
Once the actual trial date arrives, all parties and witnesses re-
port to a specified courtroom before the judge. Lay people igno-
rant of the facts and generally unfamiliar with the law are sum-
moned to serve as jurors, those who will make the ultimate deci-
sion. Jurors are selected to a panel by the lawyers for each par-
ty." Witnesses are called and testify under formal rules of evi-
dence, designed specifically to prevent jurors from hearing certain
information, and are cross-examined on their testimony. Exhibits
are introduced. Jurors listen to the testimony and receive the ex-
hibits but do not take any active part in the process. When testi-
mony ends, the lawyers for the two sides summarize the case in
speeches to the jury. At this point, after the jury has heard the
facts, the judge "instructs" the jury44 on "the law," the rules of the
dispute as derived from prior cases or from statutes, thus essen-
tially channeling the jury's ultimate decision into a path that
makes it consistent with decisions in similar disputes. After de-
liberation, the jury-often today by majority vote-issues a ver-
dict" and assesses damages. The parties make written post-trial
motions; the judge reviews the jury's verdict to ensure it is in ac-
cordance with its instruction, and the motions are granted or de-
nied." A judgment is issued.
The losing party may then appeal the judgment to an appellate
court of three or more judges. An entire written record of the pro-
40. See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 26 (Duty to Disclose; General Provisions Governing
Discovery).
41. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 56 (Summary Judgment).
42. In fact, mediation is often required by law in both federal and state courts before a
case proceeds to trial.
43. See FED. R. CIV. P. 47 (Selecting Jurors).
44. See FED. R. CIV. P. 51(b) (Instructions).
45. See FED. R. Civ. P. 48(b) (Verdict).
46. See FED. R. Civ. P. 50 (Judgment as a Matter of Law in a Jury Trial; Related Mo-
tion for a New Trial; Conditional Ruling).
47. See FED. R. CIV. P. 54 (Judgment; Costs); FED. R. CIV. P. 58 (Entering Judgment).
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ceeding is compiled and forwarded to the new judges," along with
extensive legal briefs prepared by lawyers for each party detailing
the alleged errors in the proceedings below.49 After reading the
record and reviewing the briefs, the lawyers for each party are
brought into the appellate court to give short speeches to the judg-
es.so The judges then return to their chambers and decide the
case. They write an opinion affirming or reversing the judgment,
or various parts of it. If there is a reversal, the matter is sent back
to the earlier judge to take up the proceedings again. In any
event, the appellate judges prepare a written opinion detailing the
reasons for their decision, which is subsequently recorded, printed
and bound, and made available to later lawyers as precedent,
which will be relied upon in subsequent disputes.
By and large, this structural technique is still in use today. A
lawyer from 1914, transported magically to 2014, would-after
replacing computers and printers for typewriters and bound vol-
umes and after learning to put bar codes on exhibits-feel very
much at home. Such changes to the technique have chiefly made
it more drawn-out and much more expensive. In a world where
the drive for efficiency has promoted fundamental changes in al-
most every sphere of life, the structural techniques employed by
courts in contract cases today is an anomaly.
III. THE RULE TECHNIQUE OF CONTRACT LAW
The rule technique of contracts developed as part of the common
law of England, and was transported to the Americas with British
settlers. It is conventional to start the story of the development of
Anglo-American legal rules with the Norman Conquest in 1066.51
In the first years after the Conquest, there was no real law "of"
England at all.5 2 The country was a hodgepodge of local communi-
ties, each with its own admixture of customary laws derived from
the various waves of invaders who had swarmed over the island in
the previous millennium-Celts, Romans, Picts, Angles, Saxons,
Jutes, Norsemen, and finally Frenchmen-and from the local idio-
syncrasies and practices that inevitably build up in isolated com-
48. See FED R. APP. P. 10 (The Record on Appeal).
49. See FED R. APP. P. 28 (Briefs).
50. See FED R. APP. P. 28 (Oral Argument).
51. See POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 33.
52. This is necessarily a caricature of a very complicated process. The chaotic situation
in English law at the time of the Conquest is detailed in POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note
33.
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munities. There was no tool to bring order out of this chaos until
the development of the assizes.5 ' That development in structural
technique allowed for development of a new rule technique. The
judges began to develop a "common" law of England out of the
myriad rules the itinerant judges found in the hinterlands. 54 The
branch of law we call contracts developed out of this common law.
But a body of contract law as we think of it today was not pre-
sent in those early years. None of the invading groups except the
Romans had ever had anything except the most rudimentary no-
tions of "contract" beyond the most simple of exchanges. There
was little need for such law in a society with limited transporta-
tion and communications, and where most transactions were local
and performed in accordance with local custom. In the few cities
where trade was relatively important, merchants simply opted out
of the crude legal system by developing their own bodies of cus-
toms and rules that they enforced themselves.5 ' As the country
grew and became more interconnected, however, the royal courts
began developing a common law dealing with commercial transac-
tions. Yet there was still no general law of contracts. On the eve
of the American Revolution, there were, instead, laws relating to
various specific types of transactions: feoffnents, mortgages,
bailments, loans, pledges of property, agreements under seal, and
so forth. These were all brought under a variety of different forms
of action and procedure such as action of covenant, debt, trespass,
assumpsit, detinue, replevin, and ejectment. So unfamiliar was
our contemporary concept of contract in those days that only a
decade before the Revolution, the most influential English-
language legal text, Sir William Blackstone's Commentaries,"7
53. See part II, supra.
54. The traveling judges, exchanging notes, found themselves able to begin to catego-
rize disputes and develop a set of "common pleas," or standardized writs that could be is-
sued by the courts in particular kinds of disputes. Thus, the judicial structure permitted
standardization of rules across the realm. A detailed description of the process is found in
ARTHUR R. HOGUE, ORIGINS OF THE COMMON LAw (1986).
55. 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 33, at 182-83.
56. The history of the process is set forth in LEON E. TRAKMAN, LAW MERCHANT: THE
EVOLUTION OF COMMERCIAL LAw (1983).
57. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (4 vol. 1765-69).
On the eve of the Civil War, American lawyers were still relying heavily on later editions of
Blackstone, which was held to be the best training for a new lawyer. See Louis F. Del Duca
& Alain A. Levasseur, Impact of Legal Culture and Legal Transplants on the Evolution of
the U.S. Legal System, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 4 (2010).
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which otherwise deals with every aspect of English law, hardly
mentions the idea of "contracts."
A. Development of Contract Rule Technique
The origins of the contemporary law of contracts and its rule
technique lie in the first decades after the stirring events of 1776.
The American Declaration of Independence taught that "all men
are created equal."" Adam Smith's The Wealth of Nations, pub-
lished that same year, taught that when all men are free and al-
lowed to pursue their own private interests, society as a whole
benefits from an increase in wealth, the concept that came to be
known as "the invisible hand."6 0 The ideas that the law ought to
allow men to organize their own lives by making their own bar-
gains, and that the job of the state was merely to enforce those
bargains, began to take root in society.
The first legal text to treat the notion of "contract" as a distinct
subject separate and apart from all the various transactions to
which it applies appeared in 1790. The author, an otherwise un-
known barrister named John Joseph Powell, discerned that all of
the hitherto-distinct bodies of law relating to transactions were
unified by a single underlying principle: "[I1n all these transac-
tions, there is a mutual consent of the minds of the parties con-
cerned in them, upon agreement between them, respecting some
property or right that is the object of stipulation."" From that
date a stream of treatises began to appear on the new subject of
"contracts."6 2 Powell's articulation of consent to be bound as a cen-
tral theme began more and more to be reflected in judicial opin-
58. See 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 57, at 440-70 (treating contract chiefly as but one of
the various ways of transferring title to chattels); see also 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra
note 33, at 182 (noting that for Blackstone contract was a "mere supplement to the law of
property").
59. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
60. See ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (Thrifty Books 2009) (1776).
61. 2 JOHN JOSEPH POWELL, ESSAY UPON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS AND AGREEMENTS vii
(1790). See also id. at 9 ("it is of the essence of every contract or agreement, that the par-
ties to be bound thereby should consent to whatever is stipulated; for, otherwise, no obliga-
tion can be contracted, or concomitant right created").
62. See, e.g., JOHN NEWLAND, A TREATISE ON CONTRACTS: WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF
COURTS OF EQUITY (1806); ROBERT JOSEPH POTHIER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
OBLIGATIONS, OR CONTRACTS (William David Evans trans. 1806); SAMUEL COMYN, A
TREATISE OF THE LAW RELATIVE TO CONTRACTS AND AGREEMENTS NOT UNDER SEAL (1807);
H. T. COLEBROOKE, TREATISE ON OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS (1818); DANIEL CHIPMAN,
AN ESSAY ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS: FOR THE PAYMENT OF SPECIFICK ARTICLES (1822);
JOSEPH CHITTY, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS NOT UNDER SEAL
(1834).
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ions. In these opinions, it should be noted, the concept seems to be
treated as a principle so fundamental as almost not to need stat-
ing, let alone requiring any citation.63
It is common among legal scholars to attribute these changes in
rule technique to the inventions of the treatise-writers and to the
judges and lawyers who slavishly followed their theories.6 4 But
the truth is that the judges who began citing these treatises, like
virtually all lawyers at all times, were bricoleurs. That is, they
were men who set out to get to a certain result and they used
whatever was at hand to cobble it together. This, of course, is the
essence of legal brief-writing ("Find everything that supports our
position!") and is frequently seen in judicial opinions, where help-
ful facts and authorities are emphasized and bad facts and author-
ities are misrepresented or ignored." The idea of free contract
63. See, e.g., United States v. Gurney, 8 U.S. 333, 343 (1808) ("Contracts are always to
be construed with a view to the real intention of the parties."); Barton v. Bird, 1 Tenn. 66,
71 (1804) ("The assent of parties to a contract is essentially necessary to its obligatory force.
The minds of parties having an equal view of the subject matter, should concur . . .. To
discover this concurrence . .. is the first object of the court."); Bruce v. Pearson, 3 Johns.
534 (N.Y. 1808) (where a buyer ordered six hogsheads of rum and the seller delivered only
three, there was no meeting of the minds ("aggregatio mentium") and hence no contract);
Mactier's Adm'rs v. Frith, 6 Wend. 103, 139 (N.Y. 1830) ("To make a contract there must be
an agreement-a meeting of the minds of the contracting parties."); Chesapeake & Ohio
Canal Co. v. Baltimore & 0. R. R. Co., 4 G. & J. 1, 129-30 (1832) (a contract "is a mutual
consent of the minds of the parties concerned"); New-Haven Cnty. Bank v. Mitchell, 15
Conn. 206, 218 (1842) ("Until . . . acceptance, it is not consummated into a contract, but
remains a mere proposition, and there has been no meeting of the minds of the parties. It
is the acceptance which constitutes such meeting and consummation."); Clark v. Sigourney,
17 Conn. 511, 520 (1846) ("the meeting of the minds of the parties in the transaction ... is
the consummation of the contract"); Planters' Bank v. Snodgrass, 5 Miss. 573, 639 (1846)
(Sharkey, J., dissenting) ("In all contracts there must be an assent or meeting of the minds
of the contracting parties, either actual or constructive."); Boston & Maine R.R. v. Bartlett,
57 Mass. 224, 227 (1849) ("the meeting of the minds of the parties ... constitutes and is the
definition of a contract").
64. This is a common theme, even among scholars who disagree strongly about how the
process actually worked. Compare MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, 160-210 (1977) (arguing that the change was sudden and driv-
en by lawyers working to pave the way for the new industrialism of the nineteenth centu-
ry), with A.W.B. Simpson, The Horwitz Thesis and the History of Contracts, 46 U. CHI. L.
REV. 533 (1979) (arguing that the change was less dramatic than it is often scene, and
finding various pieces of the new doctrine lying much further back in English history). Cf
James W. Fox, Jr., The Law of Many Faces: Antebellum Contract Law Background of Re-
construction-Era Freedom of Contract, 49 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 61 (2007) (finding the legal
landscape in the antebellum period to be more complex and varied than is usually thought).
65. Justice Cardozo, for example, is frequently used as an example of a "disingenuous
judge" who massages and misstates law and facts. See, e.g., Dan Simon, The Double-
Consciousness of Judging: The Problematic Legacy of Cardozo, 79 OR. L. REV. 1033, 1035 &
nn. 17-24 (2000) (summarizing the view of Cardozo's critics). The judge himself wrote, "I
often say that one must permit oneself, and that quite advisedly and deliberately, a certain
margin of misstatement. Of course, one must take heed that the margin is not exceeded,
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was in the air and the role of the lawyer when values change is to
craft a reasonable explanation that can be translated into rule
technique." The judges did not adopt the new views because they
relied on the treatise-writers, they quoted the treatise-writers be-
cause they supported the views that the judges had reached on
other grounds. When Chief Justice Marshall wrote in 1827 that
individuals had a "right to contract" that was "anterior to, and
independent of society," and that "like many other natural rights
. . . [is] not given by human legislation," 7 he was not making a
doctrinal legal argument derived from any treatise writer, but was
articulating a powerful social view that was coming to be domi-
nant in many areas of society68 including not only among business
entrepreneurs, but also among freed slaves, abolitionists, wage
laborers, and feminists."
The ideology of contract as a human right fostered a body of le-
gal doctrine that in turn shaped contract rule technique in the
mid-nineteenth century. The ideology continued to be influential
into the first few decades of the twentieth century. In some re-
just as the physician must be cautious in administering the poisonous ingredient which
magnified will kill, but in tiny quantities will cure." Benjamin N. Cardozo, Law and Litera-
ture, 14 YALE REV. 699 (1925), reprinted in BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, LAW AND LITERATURE
AND OTHER ESSAYS AND ADDRESSES 7 (1931).
66. To take an obvious example, when society favored racial segregation, judges and
lawyers had no trouble finding a legal rationale for it. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537
(1896). When first baseball and then the military became integrated, and segregation
began to be seen as a national embarrassment, lawyers had no trouble coming to the oppo-
site conclusion. See Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Legal doctrine-
and the rule technique that embodies it-generally conforms itself to the world, not vice-
versa.
67. Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. 213, 345 (1827).
68. The point can be illustrated by the fact that Powell's thesis can be traced to two
works by a Frenchman, Robert Joseph Pothier, who articulated a "will theory" of contract
more than a decade before the Revolution. See Robert Joseph Pothier, TRAIT9 DES
OBLIGATIONS (1761); Robert Joseph Pothier, Du Contrat de vente (1762); see also Joseph M.
Perillo, Robert J. Pothier's Influence on the Common Law of Contract, 11 TEX. WESLEYAN L.
REV. 267 (2005) (tracing the adoption of Pothier's ideas in Britain and America). In the
early 19th century, Pothier's works "were avidly received by the 19th-century English
courts," REINHARD ZIMMERMANN, THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS: ROMAN FOUNDATIONS OF THE
CIVILIAN TRADITION 830 (1990)-so avidly, in fact, that Pothier's bust adorns the United
States Capitol as one of the titans of legal history. But they were eagerly received, in our
view, in the way that a man with a nail eagerly looks around for anything that might be
used to hammer it in. Pothier's most influential work lay largely unnoticed in England
until 1806, when it apparently became important to issue an English translation that went
on to be regularly reprinted for several decades. See ROBERT JOSEPH POTHIER, A TREATISE
ON THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS (W. Evans trans. 1806). In this history, the
treatise writers seem to be the carts, not the horses.
69. For an account of the value put on the essential nature of freedom to contract in
that period, see AMY DRU STANLEY, FROM BONDAGE TO CONTRACT: WAGE LABOR,
MARRIAGE, AND THE MARKET IN THE AGE OF SLAVE EMANCIPATION (1998).
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spects, as we will see, it is still with us today. The rise of the new
contract rule technique was remarkably rapid. By 1861, a promi-
nent English lawyer, viewing the scene on both sides of the Atlan-
tic, remarked that the chief difference between the new legal sen-
sibility and the old was the vast scope now given to contract law.70
This was true enough, but that particular concept of contract,
and the technique that embodied it, was in many respects narrow.
It was a rule technique based on the concept of a formalistic, lais-
sez-faire system that treated all individuals as formally equal and
equally entitled to control their own decisions and be responsible
for their own actions. It gave individuals great power over their
own individual commitments, and the government (through its
judges) very limited influence. In effect, it was a system in which
an individual would be bound only if it was very clear that he in-
tended to be bound-but which also held him strictly to the bar-
gains that he made, no matter how bad they turned out to be.
Courts viewed the contract as something that existed separate
and apart from the legal system; their only job was to enforce the
contract if one had actually been made." Contemporary commen-
tators usually call this, most with some scorn, the era of "classical
contract law."7 2 It has been aptly described as "a world in which
courts perform an essentially administrative role in contract, lend-
ing the coercive power of the state to back up indisputable private
obligations."" It was, and was designed to be, rigid, axiomatic,
inflexible, clear, predictable, deductive, objective, standardized,
insensitive to the specific facts of particular cases, and disengaged
70. SIR HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAw 179 (1861). He went on:
Some of the phenomena on which this proposition rests are among those most fre-
quently singled out for notice, for comment, and for eulogy. Not many of us are so
unobservant as not to perceive that in innumerable cases where old law fixed a man's
social position irreversibly at his birth, modern law allows him to create it for himself
by convention; and indeed several of the few exceptions which remain to this rule are
constantly denounced with passionate indignation. The point, for instance, which is
really debated in the vigorous controversy still carried on upon the subject of negro
[sic] servitude, is whether the status of the slave does not belong to bygone institu-
tions, and whether the only relation between employer and labourer which com-
mends itself to modem morality be not a relation determined exclusively by contract.
Id. at 179-80 (emphasis added).
71. See, e.g., Trustees of Parsonage Fund v. Ripley, 6 Me. 442, 447 (1830) ("it is not our
province to make contracts for the parties, but to give effect to such as they have made").
72. The term owes much of its popularity to GILMORE, supra note 4.
73. Mark P. Gergen, A Theory of Self-Help Remedies in Contract, 89 B.U.L. REV. 1397,
1439 (2009).
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from the particular views of justice of judges or juror.7 4 Rules of
this nature allow prudent men to control the precise nature of
their potential liability.
Thus, contract rule technique became what is today called "for-
malistic." To bring a successful contract claim-that is, to cause
the state to compel one unwilling private citizen to hand over
money to another private citizen-the technique developed a se-
ries of categories and hurdles that had to be met. Even to demon-
strate that an enforceable contract existed was not always easy."
There had to be mutual assent, as proved through acts of the par-
ties; without that neither party would be bound." The contract
was made by an exchange of offer and acceptance. An offer had to
be made in the proper form and it could be withdrawn freely at
any time, even if a party had promised to keep it open.77 Ac-
ceptance could be made only by the person authorized by the offer,
and only if made in strict compliance with the terms of the offer;
any variation, however slight, would result in the failure of the
contract." An acceptance that purported to vary the terms of the
offer became, in turn, a counter-offer, which then had to be agreed
to by the original offeror in the same manner as an acceptance if a
contract were to be formed. The promise had to be supported by
consideration, a notoriously tricky doctrine that let many promises
slip through the cracks." Some contracts required written memo-
randa to be enforceable, and the rules could be applied strictly.o
Even if there were a proper offer, acceptance, and consideration,
the contract might fail because there was a condition to its going
into effect," or the terms might be indefinite enough that the
74. This is the accurate characterization given by a modem critic. See Melvin Aron
Eisenberg, The Emergence of Dynamic Contract Law, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1743, 1749 (2000).
Eisenberg and many modern scholars prefer rules that are "supple," "dynamic," responsive
to (what the judge or jury after the fact thinks were) "the actual objectives of the parties,"
and sensitive to (what the judge later determines to have been) the "actual facts and cir-
cumstances of the parties' transaction." Id. As we will see, this latter view has become
dominant in the rule structure of modern-day America.
75. For simplicity's sake, these comments on classical contract law's rule technique are
taken from two well-known works of the classical period, C.C. LANGDELL, A SUMMARY OF
THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (1880), and WILLIAM E. CLARK, JR., A HAND-BOOK OF THE LAW OF
CONTRACTS (1894). Both were books designed for law students and general practitioners
and provide a straightforward account of the rules during the classical era.
76. LANGDELL, supra note 75, at 193-94.
77. Id. at 197-204.
78. Id. at 1-23.
79. Id. at 58-122.
80. CLARK, supra note 75, at 87-146.
81. LANGDELL, supra note 75, at 205-39.
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court could not be sure of what the agreement was.8 2 In other
words, getting into an enforceable contract required work and
forethought.8 3 The role of judges and juries was merely to carry
out that to which the parties had agreed.
Like any other technology, rule technique is never entirely sta-
ble; as noted above it is changed to fit the perceived needs of the
day. The rule technique of classical contract law, adapted to a so-
cial idea of personal responsibility, free enterprise, private order-
ing, and minimal government controls, was changed as social en-
thusiasm for those ideas waned. Exactly how and why contract
rule technique changed is a matter of controversy." Briefly stat-
ed, a great many groups found that the uncontrolled world of free
contract was uncongenial. Laborers, farmers, and other groups
resented the power that free contract gave to the new industrial
enterprises. The new industrial enterprises, on the other hand,
were concerned about being undercut by competitors who could
compete with them on lower prices if they faced no restrictions on
their agreements. Progressives sought more government control
and social accountability over an economy that hitherto had been
left almost entirely to private ordering. White workers in the
North were worried about competition from African Americans
and the flood of new Asian immigrants hired at very low wages.
Working men were concerned about competition from women who
would often work for less money. Segregationists, as part of the
Jim Crow regime, sought to limit the contract rights of the recent-
ly freed slave population and thus keep them in bondage." In
82. CLARK, supra note 75, at 10-11.
83. A later commentator, looking at these hurdles, carped that classical contract law
'seems to have been dedicated to the proposition that, ideally, no one should be liable to
anyone for anything." GILMORE, supra note 4. But this is hyperbole from a determined
critic. It is more accurate to say that "ideally, the government should not make anyone
liable to another under a theory of contract unless it was clear that he or she had agreed to
be bound, and then only to terms that he or she had specifically agreed to."
84. Traditional lawyer-based accounts are P.S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF
CONTRACT (1979); MORTON HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960,
33-64 (1992); GILMORE, supra note 4. Less traditional, but still heavily lawyer-centered, is
LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, CONTRACT LAW IN AMERICA (1965). A radically different account,
stressing the social forces that drove changes in the law, is DAVID E. BERNSTEIN,
REHABILITATING LOCHNER: DEFENDING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AGAINST PROGRESSIVE REFORM
73-89 (2011). An examination of one aspect of the changes, the sale of goods under the
Uniform Commercial Code, is Snyder, supra note 21. See also JAMES GORDLEY, THE
PHILOSOPHICAL ORIGINS OF MODERN CONTRACT DOCTRINE (1991) (focusing heavily on
changes in underlying philosophical theories).
85. A case illustrating many of these mixed motives is Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S.
45 (1905), where a coalition of industrial bakeries, labor unions dominated by German-
American men, and public health advocates pushed through laws restricting the working
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short, after a brief fling with freedom, there came a powerful,
overlapping consensus that people should not always be allowed to
follow their own ends and make their own deals.
As the underlying social goals changed, contract rule technique
was changed to keep pace. Tracing its changes over the course of
the twentieth century is far beyond the scope of this paper. For
our purposes it is enough to know that the changes were substan-
tial.
B. Contract Rule Technique in Contemporary America
On the surface, the rule technique of today looks remarkably
similar to that of the classical period." Virtually all of the old
concepts are still there: offer, acceptance, mutual assent, consider-
ation, conditions, writing requirements, and so on. But they have
been changed to such an extent that almost none of them mean
what they used to. The most fundamental change is probably the-
oretical-a change in the basic concept of who creates the contract.
In the classical era, courts assumed that the parties created the
contract and the courts merely enforced it, much like the old-time
baseball umpire who said, "There's balls and there's strikes, and I
calls 'em the way I sees 'em."" In that view, the pitcher creates
the ball or the strike, the umpire's job is merely to try to deter-
mine what the pitcher did. The umpire might be right or wrong,
but the umpire is focused on an external reality. The view today
is radically different. Courts these days are like the modern um-
pire who says, "There's balls and there's strikes, but they ain't
nothin' until I calls 'em." In this world, before the umpire's deci-
sion there is nothing except a thrown ball-the "ball" or "strike" is
created by the umpire's decision, and thus the umpire can be nei-
ther right nor wrong as a matter of external reality. In contempo-
rary contract law, it is the judge's decision that creates the con-
tract. There is no "thing" independent of the judge that consti-
hours and other conditions of bakers in an effort to shut down rival small bakeries operated
mainly by Jews, Italians, and other immigrants. See BERNSTEIN, supra note 84, at 23-39.
86. Cf. Jay M. Feinman, Essay: Critical Approaches to Contract Law, 30 UCLA L. REV.
829, 833 (1983) ("modern law embodies both a rejection of classical law and a retention of
key elements of it").
87. The baseball metaphor for contract adjudication comes from Robert L. Birmingham,
Book Review, Teaching Contracts: Coming Home to Roost, 69 B.U.L. REV. 435, 455-56
(1989) (review of P.S. ATIYAH, ESSAYS ON CONTRACT (1986)).
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tutes a "contract."" This change of view carries fundamental im-
plications for every aspect of the technique, because it transfers
power over the transaction from the parties to the judge (an agent
of the state), and allows for the contemporary idea that judges
have discretion in the way they deal with contracts. This discre-
tion, embodied today in a variety of open-ended standards that
provide little actual guidance for judges, allocates to them great
power over the existence and scope of contractual obligations."
1. The Fragmentation of Contract Technique
When we get to the nuts and bolts of contemporary contract rule
technique, the first thing we notice is that the once unitary set of
rules has fragmented. The common law of contracts still exists,
but it applies only to certain types of transactions, chiefly con-
tracts for real estate, services, and transfers of intellectual proper-
ty. Those rules are largely set out in the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts." Contracts for the sale or lease of goods-that is, eve-
rything that is tangible and moveable-along with personal prop-
erty mortgage contracts, sales of investment securities, bank de-
posits, and documents of title, are governed by the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, which has eleven different sets of rules." Interna-
tional sales of goods are governed by a U.S. treaty, the United Na-
tions Convention on Contracts for the International Sales of
Goods.92 Whole areas of what traditionally was contract law have
been overlain with so many other rules that they have become
subjects of their own in practice and in law-school classrooms,
such as employment law,9 3 insurance law,9 4 debtor-creditor law,"
88. Id. at 456 (noting that God makes things like chickens, which exist apart from our
human contemplation, but a "bargain" exists only if a judge thinks it does).
89. See generally Richard Danzig, A Comment on the Jurisprudence of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 27 STAN. L. REV. 621 (1975).
90. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS (1981) (hereinafter "REST. 2D").
91. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (2012-13 ed.); see generally JAMES J. WHITE &
ROBERTS. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (6th ed. Hornbook Series 2010).
92. See The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods, Mar. 2, 1987, S. Treaty Doc. No. 98-9, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3; ROALD MARTINUSSEN,
OVERVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL CISG SALES LAW: BASIC CONTRACT LAW ACCORDING TO THE
UN CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (2006).
93. See, e.g., TIMOTHY P. GLYNN, RACHEL ARNOw-RICHMAN & CHARLES A. SULLIVAN,
EMPLOYMENT LAW: PRIVATE ORDERING & ITS LIMITATIONS (2d. ed. 2011).
94. See, e.g., KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, INSURANCE LAW AND REGULATION (5th ed. 2010).
95. See, e.g., ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, LAW OF DEBTORS AND
CREDITORS (6th ed. 2008).
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pension and benefit law," consumer law, government contracts,
labor law,9 and products liability law.o Other areas have been
carved out by specialized legislative schemes, such as ocean car-
riage of goods,' and contracts for air transport.10 2
Common law contract thus has become a kind of catch-all area
for the "leftovers" not covered by any of the specialized schemes,os
yet it has remained-in the eyes of judges, lawyers, and legal
scholars, at least-important. The category of "leftovers" is still
quite large, and the principles of contemporary contract rule tech-
nique continue to play, to a greater or lesser extent, roles even in
the separate sets of rules just mentioned. Because we are talking
here about contracts as its own "subject" area, we will focus on
what is considered to be the contemporary common law of con-
tracts.
2. The Elements of Contract Rule Technique
The general rules are systematized in the Second Restate-
ment.104 Because we will be arguing that most of the rules embod-
ied in current rule technique are likely to disappear as matters of
practical concern in the years ahead, it is necessary to sketch the
various pieces of the technique and how they fit together, and for
this we will rely on the Second Restatement as a handy, though
not always entirely accurate, statement of the rules. The tech-
nique breaks any contract dispute into twelve questions, all of
96. See, e.g., KATHRYN J. KENNEDY & PAUL T. SHULTZ III, EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW:
QUALIFICATION AND ERISA REQUIREMENTS (2d ed. 2012).
97. See, e.g., JOHN A. SPANOGLE JR. ET AL., CONSUMER LAW, CASES AND MATERIALS (4th
ed. 2013).
98. See, e.g., CHARLES TIEFER & WILLIAM A. SHOOK, GOVERNMENT CONTRACT LAW IN
THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2012)
99. See, e.g., ARCHIBALD COX ET AL, LABOR LAW (15th ed. 2011).
100. See, e.g., DAVID A. FISCHER, WILLIAM POWERS, JR.& RICHARD L. CUPP JR.,
PRODUCTS LIABILITY: CASES AND MATERIALS (5th ed. 2013).
101. Several different federal statutes combine to form a fairly intricate scheme. See
Harter Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 30701-30707 (2013); Pomerene Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 80101-80116
(2013); Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30701 (note)-30707 (note) (2013); Ship-
ping Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 40101-40104; Ocean Shipping Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. 105-258,
112 Stat. 1902 (1998). The interrelation of the various rules is described in Conte C. Cica-
la, A Punic Web: Statutes and Contracts Affecting the Container Trade, 25 U.S.F. MAR. L.J.
153 (2012/2013).
102. See Montreal Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International
Carriage of Goods by Air, 28 May 1999, 2242 U.N.T.S. 350.
103. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CONTRACT LAW IN AMERICA: A SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC
CASE STUDY 193 (1965).
104. REST. 2D, supra note 90.
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which a judge must answer on the way to a final determination
that a contract has been breached.
1. Did these particular parties have the power to make a con-
tract? This is called the question of "capacity."" Today, most peo-
ple and entities have the power to enter into contracts. The broad
exceptions are "infants" (that is, minors below the legal age)"oe and
those who are mentally infirm."o' The latter category, in an age
where psychiatric understanding and diagnoses of mental illness
are rapidly evolving, can become complicated."oe Both minors and
the mentally infirm, however, are liable to pay for "necessaries"
provided to them, although this is a restitution remedy that is
outside the scope of formal contract law."o9
2. Did the parties reach an "agreement" for a contract? This is
the category traditionally called "formation.""'o This covers the
requirement that the parties demonstrate "mutual assent,""' the
rules governing what counts as an "offer,"ll 2 how long offers re-
main open and thus available to be accepted," 3 and how "ac-
ceptance" must be effected.114 The rules are highly detailed to
meet a number of different scenarios.
3. Was the contract supported by consideration? In the classical
age, all enforceable contracts were said to require consideration.
It has always been a slippery concept, and contemporary tech-
nique has not made it simpler. Today the term is used to refer to
a "performance or return promise" that has been "bargained
for."" That seems simple enough, but there follow a myriad of
special rules relating to such things as promises to perform a
preexisting legal duty,116 promises made in settlement of claims,117
105. Id. §§ 9-16.
106. Id. § 14.
107. Id. § 15.
108. Compare Ortelere v. Teachers' Retirement Board, 250 N.E.2d 460 (N.Y. 1969) (find-
ing retiree to have been mentally incompetent to change her beneficiary designation), with
McGovern v. Commonwealth, 517 A.2d 523 (Pa. 1986) (finding retiree in similar situation
to be competent).
109. See REST. 2D, supra note 90, § 12 cmt. f (leaving the question of necessaries to cov-
erage under the RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION §§ 62, 112-17, 139 (1937)).
110. Id. §§ 17-70.
111. Id. §§ 18-23.
112. Id. §§ 24-34.
113. Id. §§ 35-49.
114. Id. §§ 50-70.
115. Id. § 71.
116. Id. § 73.
117. Id. § 74.
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conditional promises,' "illusory" and alternative promises,1 9 and
promises that are voidable or are for some reason unenforceable.120
4. If there was no consideration, is the promise enforceable even
without it? Contemporary technique has taken various classes of
promises outside the consideration requirement, calling them gen-
erally "contracts without consideration."21 There are many specif-
ic types of these, some of which are economically quite important,
such as option contracts, 22 guaranties, 23 and modifications of
executory contracts. 124 Others are traps that lie around the fring-
es, such as promises to repay indebtedness where the statute of
limitation has lapsed or the debt has been discharged in bank-
ruptcy;125 subsequent promises to pay for things the party never
asked for; 26 or promises to pay even though the other party has
failed to perform a necessary condition.127 By far the broadest ex-
ception to the consideration requirement is that called "reliance"
or "promissory estoppel"l28 under which an unenforceable promise
can become enforceable if reasonably relied on by the other party.
5. Does the contract require a writing to be enforceable, and, if
so, is there an adequate writing? This area is usually known as
the "Statute of Frauds."29 Most oral contracts are enforceable, but
writings are required in a specified list of situations, including
some contracts made by executor administrators of decedents' es-
tates,130 suretyship contracts,13' contracts in consideration of mar-
riage,'32 contracts for the sale or lease of an interest in land,'33 and
contracts that cannot be performed within one year. 3" The Uni-
form Commercial Code adds another category, sales of goods of a
value of more than $500."' These types of contracts require that
118. Id. § 76.
119. Id. § 77.
120. Id. § 78.
121. Id. §§ 82-94.
122. Id. § 87.
123. Id. § 88.
124. Id. § 89.
125. Id. §§ 82-83.
126. Id. § 86.
127. Id. § 84.
128. Id. § 90.
129. Id. §§ 110-150.
130. Id. § 111.
131. Id. § 112-123.
132. Id. § 124.
133. Id. §§ 125-129.
134. Id. § 130.
135. U.C.C. § 2-201.
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one or more written "memorandums" show that a contract be-
tween the parties exists.136 The memorandum must be "signed" by
the party whose promise is sought to be enforced. 137 The issues of
what counts as a memorandum and what counts as a signature
have turned out to be difficult at the margins and court decisions
are not harmonious. If there is no signed writing, the contract is
unenforceable l38-Unless a party has reasonably relied on it, 13
both parties have fully performed, 40 or an oral rescission is in-
volved.141
6. Is there some defense against the formation of the contract?
Assuming the parties had capacity, that they reached a valid
agreement, that the agreement was supported by consideration (or
falls in category where it is not necessary), and the writing re-
quirement (if applicable) is satisfied, the technique provides a
number of defenses that will nevertheless defeat the formation of
the contract. There are two broad categories of these defenses: (a)
those that are said to vitiate the assent of the parties, and (b)
those that make contracts unenforceable on grounds of public poli-
cy. The former include defenses of unilateral and mutual mis-
take,'4' fraud and misrepresentation, 14 3 duress,144 and undue in-
fluence.145 The latter are all those cases in which the court refuses
to enforce contracts because the parties' bargain conflicts with
some larger public policy.'46 Examples include contracts where
parties have failed to comply with licensing requirements,4 ' con-
tracts in restraint of trade,'48 contracts relating to the custody of
children,'49 contracts that exempt a party from its own intentional,
reckless, or negligent harm,' or from its own misrepresenta-
tions,"' and contracts that require a party to commit a tort,152 vio-
136. REST. 2D, supra note 90, §§ 131-133.
137. Id. H§ 134-135.
138. Id. § 138.
139. Id. § 139.
140. Id. § 145.
141. Id. § 145.
142. Id. §§ 151-158.
143. Id. §§ 159-173.
144. Id. §§ 174-176.
145. Id. § 177.
146. Id. §§ 178-199.
147. Id. § 181.
148. Id. § 186.
149. Id. § 191.
150. Id. § 195.
151. Id. § 196.
152. Id. § 192.
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late a fiduciary duty,' or interfere with the contract of some third
person.154 If any of these defenses apply, the contract may be un-
enforceable, or some parts of it may be struck by the judge.
7. Assuming that we have an enforceable contract, what does it
require the parties to do? This is a broad area that the Second Re-
statement calls "the Scope of Contractual Obligations."' At its
core is the traditional question of pure interpretation, in the sense
of what the written or oral words used by the parties mean, and,
in the event meanings are disputed, which of the meanings should
prevail.'"' Anecdotally, at least, this is the most litigated part of
contract law. One subsidiary part of this process is determining
how much weight the judge should put on the document the par-
ties have signed (if any), as opposed to their later oral testimony
or other outside evidence-an intricate body of law known collo-
quially as the parol evidence rule.' Another is the question of
what other kinds of outside evidence can be used for interpreta-
tion, including such things as course of performance, course of
dealing, and usage of trade.' There are subsidiary rules that ap-
ply when all the other methods fail to provide a clear interpreta-
tion, such as the rule that documents are construed most strongly
against the party that drafted the document,' and interpreta-
tions that favor the best interest of the public are preferred.'
But all of that simply goes to determining what the parties meant
by their bargain, and contemporary contract rule technique goes
far beyond that. It provides tools for supplying "omitted" but "es-
sential" terms that the parties themselves did not specify,' im-
poses a duty of "good faith and fair dealing" in all contracts,"' and
adds terms to the deal derived from trade usage.'63 It also allows
the judge to strike from the agreement any term the judge finds to
be "unconscionable" and to substitute a different term.'64 Finally,
there is the question of conditions.' 5 Conditions are things which
153. Id. § 193.
154. Id. § 194.
155. Id. §§ 200-230.
156. Id. §§ 200-203.
157. Id. §§ 209-218.
158. Id. §§ 219-223.
159. Id. § 206.
160. Id. § 207.
161. Id. § 204.
162. Id. § 205.
163. Id. § 221.
164. Id. § 208.
165. Id. §§ 224-230.
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must occur before a party's performance comes due."' When and
how a term in a contract becomes a condition is matter of subtle
reasoning-a party has no duty to perform until a condition is
met;1 7 that is, of course, unless the court, for any of a variety of
reasons, "excuses" the party that failed to meet the condition.'
8. Have any of the obligations been modified or discharged?
Various actions undertaken by one or both of the parties may
cause an otherwise valid obligation to be discharged.6"' Discharg-
es of obligations usually require consideration, unless they are the
sort that are enforceable without consideration, 170 or a handful of
special circumstances exist,171 or unless a "renunciation" of the
contract is made in writing, signed by the obligee, and delivered to
the obligor.172 But this rule applies only to discharges of obliga-
tions, and there are several other ways to change the require-
ments of a contract. The parties may agree to a substitute per-
formance,17 ' a substituted contract, 174 a novation,'75 or an "accord
and satisfaction."" A party that has not objected to an erroneous
statement of account from the other party may, in certain circum-
stances, be bound to that statement.17 7 The parties may also agree
to rescind the entire contract,"' and they will be bound by any
releases 17 or contracts not to sueso that they sign.
9. Have the parties performed, or was there a breach? The Sec-
ond Restatement calls this topic "Performance and Non-
Performance."'s Every contract has its own idiosyncratic re-
quirements for what the parties are supposed to do, and when
those obligations are clear, courts will usually follow the parties'
166. The paradigm example of a condition is the death of the insured under a life insur-
ance policy. The insured has no legal obligation to die, while the insurer has no legal obli-
gation to pay unless the insured dies. The insured's death is a condition of the insurer's
liability.
167. Id. § 225.
168. Id. § 229.
169. Id. §§ 273-287.
170. Id. § 273.
171. Id. §§ 274-277.
172. Id. § 277.
173. Id. § 278.
174. Id. § 279.
175. Id. § 280.
176. Id. § 281.
177. Id. § 282.
178. Id. § 283.
179. Id. § 284.
180. Id. § 285.
181. Id. §§ 231-260.
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agreement. But the fact that the parties have specified that they
will do certain things does not mean that failure to do so will be a
breach, or that it will allow the other party to suspend perfor-
mance. The technique draws a distinction between "total" and
"partial breaches," with different rules for each. 8 2 In the absence
of explicit agreement, the rules provide answers to such questions
as when and how performances are to be exchanged 83 and in
which order are the parties supposed to perform.'84 The rules also
provide guidance as to whether judges will consider particular
failures to be "material" or not,' whether certain conduct by a
party amounts to a "repudiation" of the contract,s18 and whether a
particular failure of a party to perform discharges the other from
further performance.8 ' While the parties' agreement may be giv-
en some weight in these issues, the judge will weigh these various
factors independently.
10. Assuming a party has not performed, should the party be ex-
cused from performance? One of the major innovations in contem-
porary, as opposed to classical, contemporary contract rule tech-
nique is the concept of excuse from performance in certain situa-
tions.' 8  This is usually called the law of "impracticability and
frustration." Simply put, a party can be excused from perfor-
mance if something that happened after the contract was formed
makes it "impracticable" for the party to render its performance,'
such as the death or incapacity of a necessary person,9 o destruc-
tion of a thing necessary for the performance,' or new govern-
ment regulations on the practice.192 Similarly, a party whose pur-
pose in making the contract has evaporated due to something that
happened after the contract was signed may be excused based on
"frustration" of its purpose." To qualify, the subsequent event
must relate to "a basic assumption on which the contract was
made," and the party claiming it must be without fault. In such
case a party may be discharged, "unless the language or the cir-
182. Id. § 236.
183. Id. §§ 231-233.
184. Id. § 234.
185. Id. § 241.
186. Id. §§ 250-251.
187. Id. § 242.
188. Id. §§ 261-272.
189. Id. § 261.
190. Id. § 262.
191. Id. § 263.
192. Id. § 264.
193. Id. § 265.
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cumstances" indicate that it should not be. There are special rules
for temporary'94 and partial15 impracticability and frustration.
11. Are the particular plaintiff and defendant the correct parties
in the lawsuit? That there is a valid and enforceable contract with
an unexcused breach does not end the matter. The question is
whether this particular plaintiff and that particular defendant are
"parties" who have the power to bring a contract claim.'96 There
are several situations in which the question of who can bring an
action is more complicated. These include the issues of joint and
several promisors"' and promisees,'9 ' which can ordinarily be
determined by looking at the transaction. Two other groups, how-
ever, create more problems. The first group is called "third party
beneficiaries. "" In any contract, there may be people who benefit
by performance of the contract but who are not parties to it.
These nonparties are divided into two types, "incidental" and "in-
tended" beneficiaries.200 Whether a beneficiary is intended de-
pends on whether the judge determines that recognizing the bene-
ficiary's right to sue "is appropriate to effectuate the intention of
the parties" and "the circumstances indicate that the promisee
intends to give the beneficiary the benefit of the promised perfor-
mance."201 Only intended beneficiaries have the right to bring suit
on the contract.202 The second group of nonparties who can sue are
assignees and delegees.203 Ordinarily rights under contracts can
be assigned to third parties, who then have the right to sue on
those rights.204 Similarly, duties of performance under a contract
can ordinarily be delegated to a third party.205 A mass of detailed
rules delineates the exceptions to these basic principles, and other
rules for construing assignments and delegations. Separating
these various categories can be a formidable task.
12. If there was a breach, what remedies are available? One of
the trickiest and most important areas of contract law is that of
194. Id. § 269.
195. Id. § 270.
196. Because a contract is a private agreement among those who have consented to it, a
third party does not ordinarily have any power to enforce a contract.
197. Id. §§ 288-296.
198. Id. § 297-301.
199. Id. §§ 302-315.
200. Id. § 302.
201. Id. §§ 304.
202. Id. §§ 304, 315.
203. Id. §§ 316-333.
204. Id. § 317.
205. Id. § 318.
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remedies.206 Briefly speaking, there are two broad categories of
remedies, one of which has three alternatives. The first category
of remedies is specific performance, which is an order from the
court compelling the losing party to do what it had promised to
do.207 Specific performance is available only in limited situations
and is hedged about with a host of restrictions. It is not available
if monetary damages would make the party whole,20 8 if the judge
believes that granting the remedy would be "unfair,"209 if granting
it would be contrary to the judge's view of public policy, 210 if it
211would be difficult to enforce or supervise,211 or if it requires the
performance of personal services.212 In light of these limitations,
specific performance, as a practical matter, is reserved for very
unusual situations. The second, and much more common, catego-
ry of remedies is an award of damages, which can come in one of
three forms, known as "expectation," "restitution," and "reliance"
damages. Expectation damages are calculated by trying to put the
non-breaching party in the position it would have been in had the
contract been performed.213  Restitution damages return to the
non-breaching party any benefit it has conferred on the breaching
party.214 Reliance damages seek to make the non-breaching party
whole by giving it the amount it has expended or lost to date on
the contract.215 The non-breaching party in each case gets to
choose which measure it wants, but it can get only one of the
three. The damages will also be reduced if the damages were rea-
sonably avoidable by the non-breaching party,216 if they were not
reasonably foreseeable by the breaching party,21 or are too Uncer-
tain to measure accurately.218 Certain categories of damages are
not available for breach of contract at all, including damages for
emotional disturbance219 and punitive damages.220 If the parties
206. Id. §§ 344-385.
207. Id. §§ 357-369.
208. Id. §§ 359-360. This is almost always the case in practice, because the vast majori-
ty of contracts are reducible to monetary values, and thus there is an amount of money that
can make the individual whole.
209. Id. § 364.
210. Id. § 365.
211. Id. § 366.
212. Id. § 367.
213. Id. §§ 346-347.
214. Id. §§ 370-377.
215. Id. § 349.
216. Id. § 350.
217. Id. § 351.
218. Id. § 351.
219. Id. § 353.
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choose, they can specify in the contract the amount of damages
that should follow from a breach, but if the judge believes these
"liquidated damages" are too high or too low, the judge will invali-
date the agreed-upon remedy and apply the general law instead.2 2 '
Note the complexity here. There are rules, and exceptions to
rules, and exceptions to the exceptions. There is an elaborate sys-
tem of what seem to be solid and inflexible rules, overlaid with
extensive flexible standards that allow judges to depart from those
rules in situations that are defined only vaguely, with such terms
as "reasonable," "material," "unconscionable," "unless facts and
circumstances indicate otherwise," and so forth. A vast number of
binary rules can result in cases being tossed out of court. The re-
sult is a system that is much less predictable than that of classical
contract law.
IV. THE WORLD AS REFLECTED IN CONTRACT LAW TECHNIQUE
We have noted previously that the technique employed by a giv-
en society reflects the perceived needs of that society. It reflects a
particular state of a society at a particular time. Having marched
through the specifics of the structural and rule techniques of con-
tract law, we turn to the question of what sort of world our con-
tract law seems to presuppose.
A. The World Reflected in Structural Technique
It is fairly easy to see that the structural technique of contract
law is almost ideally fitted not to the modem world but to the
world of 1850-1950. This was an era in which there were virtually
no competitors for the legal system, and no methods of determin-
ing truth more accurately than the method devised at the assizes
centuries earlier. It seems to reflect an era when disputes often
turned on he-said-she-said claims or on the construction of simple
written communications, when live testimony and cross-
examination were probably the best method of making such deci-
sions. It presupposes an era in which transportation technology
like railroads and buses made it relatively easy and inexpensive to
assemble people together at a specific time, even at some distance,
but in which live communications at a distance were virtually im-
possible. It seems to be a world in which courts can quickly and
220. Id. § 355.
221. Id. § 356.
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cheaply resolve disputes; courts are the preferred option of liti-
gants; parties with disputes can obtain counsel easily and inex-
pensively; and no alternative approaches are more accurate or
less costly. Indeed, the infrastructure to support the system -
courtrooms, capabilities for providing notices, and recording capa-
bilities-has been largely unchanged since 1850 with the excep-
tion of, in recent years, technological advances in word processing
software and online legal research.
B. The World Reflected in Rule Technique
The architecture of classical contract rule technique was de-
signed to fit a world in which the contracting process was extreme-
ly variegated and informal, and often hard to distinguish from any
other kind of interpersonal agreement. A substantial slice of con-
tract law claims seem to be of a relatively small financial value
and based on informal exchanges of one sort or another, so a
strong doctrine of consideration is needed to separate transactions
intended to be actual commercial dealings from those that were
merely mutual undertakings among family members or close
friends. Those deals that are obviously commercial are taken to
be either one-shot transactions that were individually negotiated
by the parties, or supply arrangements of the commodity type
where the parties seem to pay little attention to the terms of their
agreements. Under modern contract theory, people are assumed
to be very bad at making contracts, and not much better at per-
forming them, and thus judges must have a great deal of leeway to
adjust the outcomes of particular disputes. There is a pervasive
sense that in doubtful situations it is better to have the parties
bound (and their rights ultimately determined by a judge) than to
let them go their own ways. In this world every dispute seems to
be important in itself, and it seems critical that courts do every-
thing possible to achieve the right result in a given case, regard-
less of cost.
The world of contract rule technique seems to assume that the
tools for preparing full written agreements are limited and the
process is so cumbersome that few parties use writings at all. It is
thus natural that when they do incur the time and expense of pre-
paring a written agreement, it should be given extra force. Hence
the parol evidence rule. It also seems to reflect a situation in
which even when there is detailed writing, it will be inadequate to
cover all the important issues-perhaps reflecting the handwrit-
ing-to-typewriter technology of an early era. Thus there will likely
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be all sorts of terms the parties have not agreed to, and therefore
courts will need an arsenal of terms to deal with the "gaps" in the
agreements. Since parties rarely thought about wars, floods,
strikes, equipment breakdowns, and various other disasters, and
these often had very serious impacts on contract performance,
courts presumably needed ways to allow parties out of their deals,
such as the doctrines of impracticability and frustration. Given
the drive to find a contract in doubtful cases, it also became im-
perative for courts to have a ready set of terms to impose in such
situations.
In the world implied by contract rule technique, there seem to
be great numbers of disputes where parties do not have anything
approaching a formal writing. When writings are used, they seem
to be short, informal, and often either handwritten or in the cryp-
tic language of telegrams. These writings are nearly always in-
complete and very often badly worded. Lawyers are rarely in-
volved in their drafting. This means that the words in these sorts
of writings require interpretation not merely of the words them-
selves, but on what unsophisticated parties meant by the words
they used. This naturally leads to a strong doctrine of "mutual
assent," to determine the parties' own meaning of the terms. It
also requires a mechanism for sorting out deals that have been
made through correspondence, a situation in which the terms of
the deal may vary over the course of the communications. Some
method is obviously needed to sort out this problem, and thus
rules of offer-and-acceptance would assume a major role.
The emphasis on the importance of usage and custom suggests a
world where business is primarily still local, and in which each
industry and each trading center have their own customs and idi-
osyncratic meanings for terms. Because any given term might
have somewhat different meanings in different trading centers,
and the terms as used by persons in a trade might differ from
those used among the general public, courts need a mechanism for
determining whether these particular parties meant words to be
used in their common sense, or in an unorthodox manner-and,
sometimes, which of two conflicting unorthodox meanings is the
"correct" one to use in this particular agreement.
The picture of the world we draw from the rule technique also
seems to be one where business is largely unstandardized and
filled with players who are not much beyond the craft-production
stage. In such a world, breaches would be very common-probably
too common for parties regularly to resort to courts for remedies-
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and thus parties routinely sigh, accept nonconforming perfor-
mances and try to work things out among themselves. In this
world, the types of items being bought and sold do not often seem
to depend on highly detailed specifications, urgent drop-dead de-
livery deadlines, and precise quantities. In such a world, someone
who stands on the letter of an agreement when the other party
has come fairly close to what was called for seems unreasonable.
Courts naturally seek to avoid what they called "forfeitures" in
such situations, and hence doctrines of "substantial perfor-
mance"-that is, performance that is close but not quite there-
and of waiver, modification, and estoppel are necessary.
The rule technique further seems to assume that contract law is
the only method for policing wrongdoing in commercial relations.
It does not seem to be contemplated that bad conduct might be
punished by legislative or administrative means, such as by con-
sumer-protection regulations. Instead, contract law seems to see a
world where judges are the only barriers between parties who are
victimized by fraud, misrepresentation, and even the occasional
case of gun-to-the-head duress. If courts cannot assume that other
government agencies are on the lookout for sharp practices, they
necessarily would want doctrines that would allow them to, if not
punish the wrongdoers, to at least prevent the court from partici-
pating in the wrongdoing. This entails a detailed system of de-
fenses (e.g., mistake, misrepresentation, duress, undue influence,
and unconscionability) that could be raised by the alleged victims.
In the same vein, the technique seems to assume a world in which
there is very little government regulation of economic matters,
and thus, absent some restraints from contract law, parties would
be free to rig bids, fix prices, form cartels, point-shave sporting
events, sell custody of children, corrupt fiduciaries, bribe agents,
and so forth. If courts assume they cannot rely on outside help to
stop cheats, swindlers, and sharp dealing, they will naturally de-
velop tools that allow them to strike down certain contracts as un-
enforceable on grounds of "public policy."
Finally, this world of contract rule technique seems to be one in
which accurate assessment of likely damages is extremely diffi-
cult. The structural technique, recall, assigned the job of as-
sessing damages to the jury, with review by the judge. The rule
technique tells the jurors to put the nonbreaching party in as good
a position as if the contract had been performed, and asks them to
assess the "loss in value" that it suffered from the defective per-
formance. This loss in value may itself be reduced if the damages
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were reasonably avoidable, or are too uncertain, or were not "fore-
seeable" at the time of the contract. Little explicit guidance is giv-
en as to how to go about assessing these things. It seems doubtful
that today any rational business would use this approach-
selecting six laymen picked at random, supervising them by a
lawyer usually untrained in accounting, and asking them to come
up with an estimate-to make reasonable predictions about its
future prospects. The calculation of damages seems rooted in a
different world, one that lacks any kind of sophisticated financial
and accounting technology.
All of this can, with some simplification, be boiled down into a
series of propositions about the world that contract rule technique
seems to reflect:
1. Contract law has a vast domain and its principles apply
over virtually the whole world of voluntary transactions.
2. Commercial transactions are frequently very difficult to
distinguish from other sorts of interpersonal transactions.
3. Transactions are usually individually negotiated and re-
flect the specific intent of these specific parties.
4. Parties routinely enter into agreements in careless, sloppy,
and idiosyncratic ways, so that it is frequently difficult to tell
if they have made a contract and, if so, what it requires.
5. Merchants in every trade and locality deliberately use
terms in ways that are understandable only to those in their
own trade and locality.
6. Strict compliance with contract terms is frequently very
difficult and parties rarely require exactitude in performance,
so something less than what was agreed to is usually fine.
7. Asking six lay people without financial training to decide
on the losses suffered under a contract, after listening to com-
peting arguments made by counsel, is a perfectly reasonable
way of determining damages.
8. It is critical to get the most accurate outcome in every giv-
en dispute, regardless of time or cost.
9. Courts deciding contract cases are the chief backstop
against fraud and unfair practices in contracting.
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In sum, contemporary contract rule technique seems to reflect a
particular world, which looks very much like America in the cen-
tury between 1850 and 1950. We still have in place the basic
nineteenth century system designed for an unregulated free en-
terprise society that depended on private ordering and minimal
regulation, and which valued personal autonomy, enterprise, and
responsibility, but we have overlaid it with extensive judicial dis-
cretion and a quasi-regulatory system of rules seemingly designed
for the industrial system of the 1950s.222 The basic structure has
stayed in place, but is now encrusted with bolt-on additions of
whatever ideas were popular at any given time. The result re-
sembles a 1882 Studebaker brougham horse-drawn carriage, mod-
ified with the whitewall tires of a 1904 Auburn, the seats from a
1917 Stutz Bearcat, the chassis of a 1926 Duesenberg, the fenders
from a 1937 Mercedes, the Hydramatic transmission from a 1941
Oldsmobile, the V8 engine from a 1952 Lincoln, and the tail fins
from a 1960 Cadillac Eldorado.23
V. THE WORLD AS IT (REALLY) IS
How closely does the world of contract as reflected in the struc-
tural and rule techniques mirror the world as we see it today?
The short answer is "not very."
A. Structural Technique
The incapacity of contemporary structural technique has been
the subject of a great deal of study. Very briefly, parties have
222. See, e.g., Snyder, supra note 21, at 25 (noting that the current UCC rules governing
sales of goods reflect "a 1960s enactment of a 1950s statute largely written in the 1940s and
reflecting the ideas of the 1930s"). It is often suggested that modern contract rule tech-
nique is much more attuned to modern business practices than was the classical law. See,
e.g., Walter F. Pratt, Jr., American Contract Law at the Turn of the Century, 39 S.C. L. REV.
415 (1988). Modern technique certainly gives more scope to judges than did classical theory
and thus on the surface may appear more accommodating to business practices, but this is
probably an illusion. The rules are still a Procrustean bed against which claims must be
measured. The chief difference is that in the classical period, if the facts did not fit the bed,
there was no contract and the parties were sent their separate ways, while today the judge
is empowered to chop and fit the facts to the bed or, if necessary, excuse a party from com-
pliance. The latter has the major advantage of being more flexible to methods of contract-
ing that do not meet classical standards, but it has the disadvantages of sometimes holding
parties liable for things that they were unaware they had agreed to, and it also injects more
uncertainty into the process.
223. Cf. Johnny Cash, One Piece at a Time, on ONE PIECE AT A TIME (Columbia Records
1976) (telling story of auto worker who assembled a car using pieces from a different Cadil-
lac parts stolen from the factory over 25 years, with disappointing results).
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been fleeing the traditional judicial system for decades. 2 4  Far
fewer contractual disputes find their way into the litigation pro-
cess than in the past, and even fewer of them actually proceed to
the jury trial that is the centerpiece of the process. There are sev-
eral reasons for this, all of which have combined to make the
breach of contract jury trial-and the appellate opinions arising
from those suits that make up the bulk of contract rule tech-
nique-less and less common.
First, the complexity and expense of the litigation system is
such that a great many cases that traditionally would have made
their way into the court system are priced out of the process. The
process today takes years to work its way through the system and
entails large legal fees that are not affordable to most people. 225
For an ordinary consumer with a contract dispute over a car or a
lease, court-enforced remedies for breach of contract are virtually
worthless.
Second, and as a partial result of the first, the rise of alternative
dispute resolution has drawn much of the business away from the
courts and into a quicker and frequently less expensive system.
Unlike the Procrustean system of contract structural technique,
arbitration and other methods for resolving disputes can be tai-
lored to the needs of the parties. These can range from informal
telephone hearings before volunteer attorneys in minor consumer
disputes, to full-fledged, wide-open litigation and trial by giant
international firms in front of distinguished experts in the rele-
vant fields. Both small players who cannot afford to hire lawyers
and large players who are dubious about having complex matters
resolved by nonspecialist judges and amateur jurors often find
arbitration to be preferable to filing a complaint in court.226
224. See Scott, supra note 18, at 378 (noting the "mass exodus from the public enforce-
ment regime by important classes of contracting parties").
225. The dean of one well-regarded law school, whose compensation almost certainly
puts him in the upper echelon of American income-earners and who obviously has both
much greater knowledge of his rights and much more access to a range of lawyers than
most Americans, has publicly stated that he does not think he could afford to litigate a
mere $100,000 dispute because the fees would be too high. See Frank H. Wu, The Perils of
Ranking, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA HASTINGS COLLEGE OF THE LAw (Apr. 5, 2012),
http://www.uchastings.edu/news/articles/2012/05/wu-perils-of-ranking.php (reprinted from
the Apr. 4, 2012 edition of The Recorder).
226. There are, to be sure, some motives for avoiding courts that may be less benign. It
is frequently asserted that large firms want to impose arbitration on consumers and em-
ployees because these firms-who are repeat players in the process-have an advantage in
arbitration because arbitrators do not want to rule against the companies who might hire
them again. It is also argued that these repeat players prefer the secrecy of arbitration to
having their own dirty laundry aired in a public judicial proceeding. And still others note
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Third, the courts themselves are abandoning contract law. With
a handful of exceptions, American courts have come down solidly
on the side of encouraging alternative dispute resolution.227 Arbi-
tration clauses are routinely enforced, even with respect to statu-
tory or constitutional claims like racial discrimination and sexual
harassment. The Supreme Court has held not only that nearly
every kind of claim is arbitrable, but that even the decision as to
whether a claim is arbitrable should be left to the arbitrator to
determine in the first instance.228 But discouraging parties from
filing contract claims in the first place is only part of what is hap-
pening. At the other end of the process, published judicial opin-
ions on contract law are decreasing in number. We are unaware of
any specific studies, but our own review of appellate opinions from
California, for example, suggests that at least three-quarters of
the contract law opinions actually written by the courts are desig-
nated as unpublished and may not be cited. What is even more
interesting is that many of these cases are not simple per curiam
memoranda affirming decisions, but are original rulings involving
novel issues and considerable legal exegesis.229 In an age where
novel issues are arising out of massive shifts in the world's econo-
mies and the ways in which business is conducted, courts deliber-
ately are providing less guidance to would-be parties. Without
some massive changes in the structural technique of contract-
that using arbitration rather than the judicial system allows big firms to sidestep the pro-
tections built into the system to protect the interests of consumers and workers, such as the
class action. Assuming all of these to be true, for our purposes the relevant point is merely
that even large companies with wealth and access to the best lawyers see very little ad-
vantage in resorting to the legal system.
227. See, e.g., AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011) (allowing for waivers
of class action rights in contract litigation).
228. See Rent-a-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63 (2010).
229. A Lexis search of California cases mentioning "breach of contract" and decided in
the first two weeks of April 2014 turns up 23 cases, 20 of which are designated as un-
published and thus may not be cited in California courts. Many of these are substantial
opinions with scores of citations, and dozens of citations, often running has long as 50 pag-
es. See, e.g., WFP Securities, Inc. v. Davis, 2014 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 2656; Shaham v.
Tenet Healthsystem QA, Inc., 2014 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 2666; Cuccia v. Purcell, 2014
Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 2675; Smally v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 2014 Cal. App. Unpub.
LEXIS 2437; San Jacinto Z, LLC v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co., 2014 Cal. App. Unpub.
LEXIS 2318; Danesh-Bahreini v. JP Morgan Chase, N.A., 2014 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS
2284. A particularly interesting example is Cheroti v. Harvey & Madding, Inc., 2014 Cal.
App. Unpub. LEXIS 2588, a 57-page discourse on California unconscionability law with
respect to arbitration clauses in light of a fairly recent U.S. Supreme Court decision.
Cheroti cites more than 50 authorities, comes with 19 footnotes, and reverses a trial court
judgment refusing to enforce an arbitration clause because while there was minimal proce-
dural unconscionability in a consumer's purchase of a car from an auto dealership, the
provision, upon examination, was not substantively unconscionable.
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which there is no reason to believe are imminent-it seems likely
that the rules adopted by appellate courts will play less and less of
a role in contract rule technique going forward.
B. Rule Technique
As for rule technique, we laid out in Part IV some basic proposi-
tions about the world on which it seems to be based. We will take
up those propositions serially.
1. Contract law has a vast domain and its principles apply over
virtually the whole world of voluntary transactions. The assump-
tion underlying the current contract rule technique is that there is
a general body of law that applies to all types of voluntarily en-
forceable disputes, whether they involve building bridges, licens-
ing software, or convincing your nephew not to smoke. We have
already noted that there are different bodies of "contract" law for
different classes of transactions,230 but that only touches the sur-
face of the issue. For example, most American lawyers were
taught contracts through the use of a canonical body of cases
learned in law school, and these cases still play prominent roles in
our technique. The striking thing is that a great many of these
cases have no apparent application in the contract law world of
today. The heads of judges and lawyers are filled with contract
doctrine rooted in cases that, if they arose today, would not even
likely be governed by the ordinary rules of contract but by other
and more specialized sets of rules. Some of the most widely-
taught contract law cases involve workers injured on the job,23 '
schoolteachers fired for being homosexual,232 companies refusing
to pay promised pensions,23 promises made in franchise solicita-
230. See part III, supra.
231. See Webb v. McGowin, 168 So. 196 (Ala. Ct. App. 1935), affd 168 So. 199 (Ala.
1936). Workplace injuries are today governed almost exclusively by state workers compen-
sation laws. In Alabama, where Webb was decided, the statutory regime is found at ALA.
CODE §§ 25-5-1 to 25-5-231 (2013).
232. See Odorizzi v. Bloomfield School Dist., 54 Cal. Rptr. 533 (1966). Discrimination in
employment against persons on the grounds of sexual orientation has been found to be
unlawful by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. See Macy v. Dep't of Justice,
EEOC Appeal No. 0120120821 (April 20, 2012); Veretto v. U.S. Postal Service, EEOC Ap-
peal No. 0120110873 (July 1, 2011); Castello v. U.S. Postal Service, EEOC Request No.
0520110649 (Dec. 20, 2011).
233. See Feinberg v. Pfeiffer Co., 322 S.W. 2d 163 (Mo. Ct. App. 1959); Katz v. Danny
Dare, Inc., 610 S.W.2d 121 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980). There is now extensive federal regulation
of pensions under the Employee Retirement and Income Security Act, at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-
1461 (2013).
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tions,23 4 workers collectively refusing to work without more pay,235
botched plastic surgeries,236 contracts for land restoration after
strip mining,2 37 employees making unwise pension elections,23 8
wages due employees who quit in the middle of a contract peri-
od ,239 child support agreements, 24 0 and convenience terminations of
government contracts.24 1 What the subsequent history of these
234. See Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, 133 N.W.2d 267 (Wis. 1965). Franchise offerings
must today be made by written offering circulars in compliance with regulations issued by
the Federal Trade Commission. See 16 C.F.R. Part 436 (2013). Wisconsin, the state where
Hoffman was decided, adopted its own law seven years after the decision. See Wisconsin
Franchise Investment Law, WIS. STAT. §§ 553.01-553.78 (2013).
235. See Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Domenico, 117 F. 99 (9th Cir. 1902). Collective job
actions against employers are today governed by provisions of the National Labor Relations
Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2013).
236. See Sullivan v. O'Connor, 296 N.E.2d 183 (Mass. 1973); Hawkins v. McGee, 146 A.
641 (N.H. 1929). The expansion of the tort law of medical malpractice has made contract
claims much less relevant in suits against physicians. A recent scholarly examination of
the problems involved in resolving the problem of medical malpractice focuses entirely on
tort, and does not even bother to mention contract warranties. See FRANK A. SLOAN &
LINDSEY M. CHEPKE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE (2008). Legislatures, moreover, have often
restricted such claims by patients, requiring them to be in writing and signed by the physi-
cian. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 725.01 (2013); MICH. CONS. L. § 566.132(g) (2014); TEX. Bus. &
COM. CODE § 26.01(b)(8) (2013); VT. STAT. § 181(7) (2013). Cf. Gault v. Sideman, 191
N.E.2d 436 (Ill. Ct. App. 1963) (dismissing warranty claim, noting that applying "the ordi-
nary rules dealing with mercantile contracts to a contract entered into between a physician
and a patient . . . is not justified," and court should strike "a balance of the legal policies of
protecting the public").
237. See Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal Co., 382 P.2d 109 (Okla. 1962). A decade after
Peevyhouse the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act, §§ 1201-1279 (2013), gave
authority to the Department of the Interior to regulate the restoration of strip-mined land.
See Judith L. Maute, Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal & Mining Co. Revisited: The Ballad of
Willie and Lucille, 89 Nw. U.L. REV. 1341, 1410 (1995) (noting that SMCRA was passed in
response to cases like Peevyhouse). Oklahoma, where Peevyhouse was decided, passed its
own Coal Reclamation Act in 1979. See OKLA. STAT. §§ 45-742.1-793 (2013).
238. See Ortelere v. Teachers Retirement Board, 250 N.E.2d 460 (N.Y. 1969). Pension
benefit procedures are now generally subject to regulation under the Employee Retirement
and Income Security Act, at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2013).
239. See Britton v. Turner, 6 N.H. 481 (1834). Employee wages and hours are now ex-
tensively regulated by federal and state regulations. See, e.g., Fair Labor Standards Act, 29
U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (2013); N.H. REV. STAT. §§ 275.1-275-70 (2013).
240. See Fiege v. Boehm, 123 A.2d 316 (Md. 1956). The crimes of bastardy and fornica-
tion at issue in Fiege are no longer illegal in Maryland, and the family law that has devel-
oped in the last half-century makes it clear that courts are not be bound by individual
agreements made by putative parents. See Lawrence P. Hampton, DISPUTED PATERNITY
PROCEEDINGS § 29.02 (2013). The unimportance of Fiege in the world of family law is illus-
trated by the fact that it appears to have been cited in a case only six times in the past
thirty years, and one of those cases showed some dubiety about its current relevance. See
Jordan v. Knafel, 880 N.E.2d 1061, 1073 (Ill. Ct. App. 2007) (finding Fiege "to lack any
persuasive or instructive value where contract law has evolved and societal notions regard-
ing intimate relationships have changed").
241. See Luten Bridge Co. v. Rockingham County, 35 F.2d 301 (4th Cir. 1929). The case
appears to have been fought out on basic principles of contract law damages rules, see Bar-
ak Richman, Jordi Weinstock & Jason Mehta, A Bridge, a Tax Revolt, and the Struggle to
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cases tends to show, more than important doctrinal principles, is a
consistent pattern of removing rule technique from the equation.
As areas of "contract" law come to be seen as socially important
(such as medical care, pensions, child support, workplace injuries,
collective bargaining, and so on) it becomes less socially desirable
to leave outcomes to the inevitably inconsistent contract-law deci-
sions of individual judges and juries and the happenstance of indi-
vidual facts. Instead, these areas are carved off from "contract"
and treated with different, more universal schemes. The new
scheme is designed to set the same rule for everyone who has a
similar problem, not just the two parties before a given court. The
role of contract shrinks accordingly.
2. Commercial transactions are frequently very difficult to dis-
tinguish from other sorts of interpersonal transactions. Current
rule technique relies on a vision in which the courts receive steady
streams of disputes that lie on the borders between contract and
social relations. Thus, the classic canon of contract law cases is
full of disputes involving uncles who promise to pay money to
nephews,242 nieces who promise to care for aunts,243 grandfathers
who make promissory notes to granddaughters,244 fathers who
promise to leave farms to their sons if they work for free,245 be-
reaved widowers who promise to pay bequests to relatives,246 fa
thers who promise to recompense tavern owners for the care of
dying sons,247 farmers who invite their sisters-in-law to move into
vacant houses on their farms, 248 buyers who replevy cows from
neighbors, 249 apartment tenants who rent their flats for parade
viewing,250 and drunken acquaintances who bluff each other in
Industrialize: The Story and Legacy of Rockingham County v. Luten Bridge Co., 84 N.C.L.
Rev. 1841 (2006), but today sound construction practices and (frequently) government regu-
lations require "termination for convenience" clauses in public contracts. See, e.g., Ameri-
can Institute of Architects Document A201, General Conditions of the Contract for Con-
struction § 14.4 (2007), reprinted in THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF ARCHITECTS OFFICIAL
GUIDE TO THE 2007 AIA CONTRACT DOCUMENTS 434 (2009); JOHN CIBINIC JR., RALPH C.
NASH JR. & JAMES F. NAGLE, ADMINISTRATION OF GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS 1049-1124 (4th
ed. 2006).
242. See Hamer v. Sidway, 27 N.E. 256 (N.Y. 1891).
243. See Davis v. Jacoby, 34 P.2d 1026 (Cal. 1934).
244. See Ricketts v. Scothorn, 77 N.W. 365 (Neb. 1898).
245. See Hertzog v. Hertzog, 29 Pa. 465 (1857).
246. See Schnell v. Nell, 17 Ind. 29 (1861).
247. See Mills v. Wyman, 20 Mass. 207 (1825).
248. See Kirksey v. Kirksey, 8 Ala. 131 (1845).
249. See Sherwood v. Walker, 33 N.W. 919 (Mich. 1887).
250. See Krell v. Henry, 119031 2 KB 740.
386 Vol. 52
The Death of Contracts
bars.251 These are quintessential one-shot deals, most of them
hardly involving true commercial relations at all, and remarkably
atypical of the general run of modern commerce. While we still
see some versions of these cases moving through the justice sys-
tem,252 they make up little of the current contract case docket.
The vast majority of business-to-business and business-to-
consumer transactions in 2014 look nothing like them.
3. Transactions are usually individually negotiated and reflect
the specific intent of these specific parties. Review of the contract
law cases in any given court during a particular period shows a
very different world from the one-shot, quasi-commercial relation-
ships forming the classic canon of contract law cases. At one time
it may have been that most individuals haggled with shop owners
over prices and terms of sale, with idiosyncratic terms relating to
payment, warranties, rights of return, and so on. And today,
while terms continue to be negotiated for big-ticket transactions-
for example, buying a fleet of Boeing 787 Dreamliners-the vast
majority of both consumer and commercial transactions in Ameri-
ca are entirely standardized and non-negotiated. These include
face-to-face purchases on fixed terms from retailers, where trans-
actions are highly routinized and individual products bear de-
tailed warranties from manufacturers that cannot be altered;253
purchases from large scale providers of services like telephone,
entertainment and life insurance, nearly all of which are made
subject to detailed contractual terms designed for mass use; con-
tracts of employment, which are increasingly subject to detailed
employee handbook regulations; and online commerce, where cus-
tomers face lengthy lists of terms and are required to indicate
their acceptance of the standard terms provided on the web site.
The common factor is the lack of negotiation and the usual clarity
and certainty of the terms.254
251. See Lucy v. Zehmer, 84 S.E.2d 516 (Va. 1954).
252. See, e.g., Conrad v. Fields, 2007 Minn. App. Unpub. LEXIS 744 (holding enforceable
on grounds of promissory estoppel a generous neighbor's voluntary promise to pay a law
student's tuition).
253. See e.g., Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding consum-
er bound by conditions included inside closed computer box).
254. Indeed, one of the most vexing issues in modern contract law theory today is that
modern commerce does not fit the old paradigm. Rather, transactions occur under stand-
ard non-negotiable "boilerplate" terms. See, e.g., OREN BAR-GILL, SEDUCTION BY
CONTRACT: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PSYCHOLOGY IN CONSUMER MARKETS (2012); MARGARET
JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE PRINT, VANISHING RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW
(2012); BOILERPLATE: THE FOUNDATION OF MARKET CONTRACTS (Omri Ben-Shahar ed.
2007).
Summer 2014 387
Duquesne Law Review
4. Parties routinely enter into agreements in careless, sloppy,
and idiosyncratic ways, so that it is frequently difficult to tell if
they have made a contract and, if so, what it requires. Many of the
leading cases relied on as a basis for contract rule technique in-
volve situations in which the parties' agreement was made up of
exchanges of asynchronous oral and written communications that
left a puzzling muddle about whether they had intended to be
bound to anything at all, and if they had, what exactly it was.
Well-known examples in the canon include Harvey v. Facey,255
Owen v. Tunison,256 and Lonergan v. Scolnic, 25 7 all of which in-
volved real estate transactions. As we just noted, however, stand-
ardized transactions in which the parties must actually signal
their affirmative intent to be bound make up the vast majority of
transactions today. There are still, of course, cases where parties
are in court arguing that a contract was (or was not) made based
on a quirky set of individualized facts, and where a creative court
can tinker with contract law to find one.258 But they seem to be
quite rare. Certainly in the real estate context, contemporary
buyers and sellers almost always rely on detailed written agree-
ments and not on cryptic exchanges of telegrams.
5. Merchants in every trade and locality deliberately use terms
in ways that are understandable only to those in their own trade
and locality. It is a staple of contract rule technique that contract
interpretation depends on understanding the peculiar local jargon
used by merchants in particular trades and localities. In a world
of highly localized trade, this was perhaps a reasonable approach.
Over the years, therefore, courts have found that, depending on
the trade and the locality, "1,000" actually means 1,200,259 "4,000"
255. [18931 AC 552 (P.C.).
256. 158 A. 926 (Me. 1932).
257. 276 P.2d 8 (Cal. Ct. App. 1954).
258. An example is Nora Beverages, Inc. v. Perrier Group of America, Inc., 269 F.3d 114
(2d Cir. 2001), a relatively recent favorite in the contract law canon, where a court found a
contract based on a series of vague back-and-forth communications. But the situation in
Nora Beverages is very different from old chestnuts like those just noted. In the latter
cases, the parties' exchanges were made up entirely of ambiguous communications that
courts had to piece together, while in Nora Beverages, the parties were deliberately ex-
changing drafts of detailed written contracts that were never signed. The court was thus
not trying to piece together the agreement, but was using the concepts to get around the
fact that the parties had detailed writings that had simply not been agreed to. The plaintiff
in Nora Beverages was not a party who faced a loss because of sloppy contracting practices,
but rather a party who wanted to recover even though the detailed agreement had never
been actually agreed to.
259. Smith v. Wilson, 3 B. & Ad. 728 (KB. 1832).
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means 2,500,260 and 49.5 percent is actually "not less than" 50 per-
cent.26 ' Goods required to be "free from tin" can, in fact, have tin
in them.26 2 "Guaranteed 50 percent" actually means "guaranteed
at least 45 or 46 percent."263 A requirement for "full bills of lading"
can be satisfied by only partial ones.2" Whatever the merits of
such holdings at an earlier stage of commerce-and one of the au-
thors has expressed doubt about them previously 265 -they seem
strangely out of step in a world of buyers and sellers intimately
linked together in an increasingly global market. "Year by year,"
points out one recent study of global contract practices, "economies
are more globalized, work more delocalized, and information more
decentralized." The result is a powerful drive toward a single in-
ternational language for business.266 Yet while students from Af-
ghanistan to Zimbabwe are learning English as a uniform interna-
tional language, contract rule technique clings to a vision of a
world where merchants deliberately use terms in ways contrary to
their ordinary meanings. As business strives toward language
that means the same thing in Taipei that it does in Terre Haute or
Tangier, there will be less and less room for claims that, for exam-
ple, the peculiar community of "horse meat scrap dealers" in Port-
land, Oregon-as opposed to everyone else in the English-
speaking world-deliberately write "minimum 50 percent protein"
when they really mean "minimum 49.5 percent protein."267
seems to us highly unlikely that in the modern world competent
260. Soutier v. Kellerman, 18 Mo. 509 (1853).
261. Hurst v. W. J. Lake & Co., 16 P.2d 627 (Ore. 1932).
262. Electric Reduction Co. v. Colonial Steel Co., 120 A. 116 (Pa. 1923).
263. Guillon v. Earnshaw, 32 A. 545 (Pa. 1895).
264. Dixon, Irmaos & Cia, Ltda. v. Chase National Bank, 144 F.2d 759 (2d Cir. 1944),
cert. denied, 324 U.S. 850 (1945).
265. See Snyder, supra note 21, at 48-50. There are substantial external costs in a re-
gime that relies on trade usage evidence. If courts enforce language as written, no matter
what the individual parties themselves happened to contemplate, an individual party in an
individual lawsuit may suffer. But in that event the party (and similarly situated parties)
will likely act to change their contract terminology to make it understandable to others. A
merchant who has once been burned by specifying "1,000" when it really meant "100 dozen"
will likely not be caught the same way twice; next time it will specify "100 dozen." Moreo-
ver, everyone else in the industry will begin to understand that using standard language is
the best way to ensure that they get what they want. This has the additional social bene-
fits of improving predictability in transactions and of reducing litigation costs. On the
other hand, if the meaning of an otherwise clear term (e.g., "50 percent") can always be
contested, no party can ever be certain what a contract provides until after it is litigated,
and litigation will thus proliferate.
266. 2013 English Proficiency Index, EDUCATION FIRST 5,
http://www.ef.edu/ /-/media/efcom/epil2014/full-reports/ef-epi-2013-report-master-new.pdf
(last visited Apr. 25, 2014).
267. See Hurst v. W. J. Lake & Co., 16 P.2d 627 (Ore. 1932).
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merchants would deliberately use language that might be confus-
ing.268 To the extent that courts insist on letting individual parties
provide their own subjective definitions, it is likely that the num-
ber of merchants fleeing the regime of contract law technique will
only accelerate.269
6. Strict compliance with contract terms is frequently very diffi-
cult and parties rarely require exactitude in performance, so some-
thing less than what was agreed to is usually fine. Despite the
existence of a few anomalies-such as the "perfect tender" re-
quirements for sales of good in the U.S.270-contract rule tech-
nique assumes that parties who insist on specific terms are never-
268. A frequent example used in defending trade usage is the instance of gold and other
precious metals, which are always sold by troy ounces rather than avoirdupois ounces. The
court in Mellon Bank, N.A v. Aetna Business Credit, Inc., 619 F.2d 1001, 1011 n.12 (3d Cir.
1980), used the following hypothetical in explaining the necessity for parol evidence on
trade usage:
For example, a contract might provide for a party to pay "$10,000 for 100 ounces of
platinum." A judge might state that the quoted words are so clear and unambiguous
that parol evidence is not admissible to vary their meaning. That judge might never
learn that the parties have a consistent past practice of dealing only in Canadian dol-
lars and follow a standard trade practice of measuring platinum in troy ounces (12 to
the pound instead of 16). This is because that judge's linguistic frame of reference in-
cludes the dollars and the ounces he or she encounters in daily life. That is not the
linguistic frame of reference of the commercial parties.
This is true enough, but in the first decades of the 21st century it seems doubtful that any
parties reasonably sophisticated enough to make a deal for 100 ounces of platinum-worth
about US$145,000 as these words are written-would not have contracts using terms like
"troy oz." and "C$" or "CAD," rather than trusting to the courts' ability to decide what the
terms were ex post.
269. There are instances of the courts' declining to recognize industry-specific language.
For two hundred years, London's Savile Row tailors have made "bespoke" suits. These
were custom fitted to the wearer, and no doubt when custom fitting was required, human
hand labor had to do it. Accordingly, the Savile Row tailors developed a technique that
required hand-cutting and hand-sewing every detail of the suit. This formally came to be
embodied in a set of standards for "bespoke" suits, each of which had to have fifty hours of
actual cutting and sewing labor by qualified tailors to carry that title. When competitors
developed technology that allowed machines to custom-cut and sew individually fitted
suits, which are virtually identical and one-tenth the price, the Savile Row tailors sued to
prevent them from calling the suits "bespoke." They lost before the British agency respon-
sible for trade names, on the ground that "bespoke" meant "custom-made," not "hand
made." See Stephen Adams, Bespoke' suits can now be made by machines after Savile Row
tailors lose legal battle, DAILY MAIL, June 18, 2008, at 15. What is interesting is the tailors'
reaction. "The Advertising Standard Authority is a shoddy organization which has made a
bad decision," said one. "They accept that the word 'bespoke' means something special and
then concluded that it doesn't matter because people misuse it. A perfectly good word is
being undermined." Vidya Ram, Savile Row Cut Down A Notch By Bespoke' Ruling,
FORBES, June 20, 2008, available at http//www.forbes.com/2008/06/20/savile-row-bespoke-
life-style-cx_vr_06201ifesavile.html. The tailors, like craftsmen of many ages, are focused
on the process (the technique), and not the outcome.
270. See UCC § 2-601; Joseph M. Perillo, CALAMARI & PERILLO ON CONTRACTS § 11.20 at
438-38 (5th ed. 2003).
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theless usually satisfied with something that is "close enough."
The "substantial performance" standard of the famous Jacob &
Youngs v. Kent27 ' case has been universally adopted in American
jurisdictions.2 72 Jacob & Youngs rested on the twin ideas that (a)
parties who had specified one thing (e.g., the "Reading pipe" speci-
fied in that case) would ordinarily be satisfied with something that
was "just as good" as what was specified (e.g., "Cohoes pipe"), and
(b) that judges and juries are capable of deciding what is, in fact,
"just as good." Both of those assumptions might well have been
true in 1922, but the world of 2014 is not dominated by an ethos of
"close enough," but by one that demands absolute, strict adherence
to standards.273  The "quality revolution" of the last thirty years
has fostered awareness that one flaw in a thousand can be devas-
tating and that a delay of even an hour in delivery time can be
enormously expensive. Many modern business techniques such as
supply chain management, 274 lean production,275 Six Sigma quali-
ty,276 and continuous process improvement 277 are designed to max-
imize productivity by eliminating every kind of unnecessary vari-
ance in every aspect of the business. It is a world where "close
271. 129 N.E. 889 (N.Y. 1921).
272. See Perillo, supra note 270, § 11.18 at 433-35; see also id. § 11.20, at 437 (noting
that "[tihe doctrine of substantial performance ... is almost universally applied").
273. The business literature on the topic of continuously increasing quality and value is
enormous, but leading texts include PHILIP B. CROSBY, QUALITY IS FREE: THE ART OF
MAKING QUALITY CERTAIN: HOW TO MANAGE QUALITY SO THAT IT BECOMES A SOURCE OF
PROFIT FOR YOUR BUSINESS (1979); THOMAS J. PETERS & ROBERT H. WATERMAN, JR., IN
SEARCH OF EXCELLENCE: LESSONS FROM AMERICA'S BEST RUN COMPANIES (1995); MASAAKI
IMAI, KAIZEN: THE KEY TO JAPAN'S COMPETITIVE SUCCESS (1988); KAORU ISHIKAWA, WHAT
Is TOTAL QUALITY CONTROL?: THE JAPANESE WAY (1988); KEKI R. BHOTE & ADI K. BHOTE,
WORLD CLASS QUALITY: USING DESIGN OF EXPERIMENTS TO MAKE IT HAPPEN (1999); PETER
S. PANDE, ROBERT P. NEUMAN & ROLAND R. CAVENAGH, THE Six SIGMA WAY: How GE,
MOTOROLA, AND OTHER TOP COMPANIES ARE HONING THEIR PERFORMANCE (2000);
MICHAEL L. GEORGE LEAN SIX SIGMA FOR SERVICE: How TO USE LEAN SPEED AND Six
SIGMA QUALITY TO IMPROVE SERVICES AND TRANSACTIONS (2003); JEFFREY LIKER & GARY L.
CONVIS, THE TOYOTA WAY TO LEAN LEADERSHIP: ACHIEVING AND SUSTAINING EXCELLENCE
THROUGH LEADERSHIP DEVELOPMENT (2011); JAIDEEP MOTWANI & ROB PTACEK, PURSUING
PERFECT SERVICE: USING A PRACTICAL APPROACH TO LEAN SIX SIGMA TO IMPROVE THE
CUSTOMER EXPERIENCE AND REDUCE COSTS IN SERVICE INDUSTRIES (2011); DAVID L.
GOETSCH & STANLEY DAVIS, QUALITY MANAGEMENT FOR ORGANIZATIONAL EXCELLENCE:
INTRODUCTION TO TOTAL QUALITY (7th ed. 2012).
274. See, e.g., SHOSHANAH COHEN & JOSEPH ROUSSEL, STRATEGIC SUPPLY CHAIN
MANAGEMENT: THE FIVE CORE DISCIPLINES FOR TOP PERFORMANCE (2d ed. 2013).
275. See, e.g., JOHN NICHOLAS, LEAN PRODUCTION FOR COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE: A
COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO LEAN METHODOLOGIES AND MANAGEMENT PRACTICES (2010).
276. See, e.g., PANDE ET AL., supra note 273.
277. See, e.g., MASAAKI IMAI, GEMBA KAIZEN: A COMMONSENSE APPROACH TO A
CONTINUOUS IMPROVEMENT STRATEGY (2012).
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enough" is not a value that many companies can tolerate, let alone
embrace.
7. Asking six lay people without financial training to decide on
the losses suffered under a contract, after listening to competing
arguments made by counsel, is a perfectly reasonable way of de-
termining damages. In 1814 it was probably reasonable to assume
that a jury of ordinary lay Americans was competent to determine
how much money their neighbors-farmers, blacksmiths, sawmill
operators, horse-copers, apothecaries, chandlers, dry-goods deal-
ers, small merchants, sellers and buyers of real estate-would
have made on a given transaction. But even by 1914, in a world
increasingly dominated by sophisticated international businesses,
this was probably a shaky assumption. And in the world of 2014
it seems entirely absurd. As we noted previously, it is unthinka-
ble that even the least sophisticated business person would try to
figure its profits on a prospective deal by calling together a group
of strangers who know nothing about the business and conduct a
focus group on the subject. In fact, one of the terrors of the litiga-
tion process for many potential defendants is the possibility of
damage awards that are almost entirely irrational.278 There are
sophisticated analytical tools available today that allow for predic-
tions with vastly more confidence than there were even twenty
years ago. A system that continues to rely on a kind of trial-by-
battle rather than on modern financial approaches is not likely to
be popular or influential.
8. It is critical to get the most accurate outcome in every given
dispute, regardless of time or cost. In some kinds of cases, such as
criminal trials, it is obviously important to make sure that the
result of the trial is as close to perfectly accurate as possible.
There are powerful personal and societal interests in making sure
both that the guilty are punished and the innocent are freed.
When an individual is on trial for capital murder, we willingly
supply procedures and resources nearly inexhaustibly to try to
ensure that the verdict is correct. The cost of that kind of proce-
dure is substantial-some $400,000 in defense costs alone.279 But
the vast majority of businesses are repeat players in the world of
278. See, e.g., Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 729 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987).
279. See KANSAS JUDICIAL COUNCIL, REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL DEATH PENALTY
COMMITTEE 1 (Feb. 13, 2014),
http://www.kansasjudicialcouncil.org/death%20penalty%2cost%20report%20final.pdf.
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contractual disputes,2 80 and the vast majority of contract disputes
cannot possibly justify that amount of legal expense. Moreover,
the vast majority of contract litigation in the contemporary world
is not made up of unusual, one-shot matters involving enormous
stakes. Rather, litigation is a simple cost of doing business. Any
given company may have dozens or even hundreds of disputes go-
ing on at the same time, with customers, suppliers, employees,
competitors, regulators, and so on. The results of very few of these
are significant in themselves. What matters is the total cost of the
disputes. Thus, modern businesses may well prefer an inexpen-
sive system that is ninety percent accurate to an expensive system
that is ninety-nine percent accurate. The same is likely true of
consumers and employees, at least those not involved in class ac-
tions or those whose claims are so large that they are very nearly
life-or-death. A free or very inexpensive arbitration process that
gives a consumer a reasonable likelihood of collecting $2,500 in a
dispute over a car warranty might be far preferable to one that
gives the same consumer a certainty of collecting that sum if the
consumer would have to pay hourly legal fees in the latter situa-
tion. Yet contract rule technique, with its elaborate doctrines and
its reliance on the sort of general standards required where lay
juries are involved, seems not to grasp this issue at all.
9. Courts deciding contract cases are the chief backstop against
fraud and unfair practices in contracting. Contract rule doctrine
is full of rules designed to protect one party from the predation of
the other. Many of these were doubtless important in the early
formation of the common law of contracts. When contract law was
taking shape, there were no regulatory agencies, no consumer pro-
tection statutes, and no family law as we know it today. There
were hardly even police forces in the sense we use them today, to
prevent or punish deliberate fraud or classical gun-to-the-head
duress. In the absence of virtually any other mechanism for pro-
tecting people against unfair practices, courts no doubt quite rea-
sonably saw themselves as the chief mechanism for policing such
bad actions. But that is hardly the world of today, where every
state has elaborate mechanisms governing proper and improper
methods of doing business. These bodies of law, such as state de-
ceptive trade practices acts (DTPA), give aggrieved consumers far
more tools than does contract law, and as a result have as a prac-
280. See Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract
Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541 (2003).
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tical matter become the primary source of consumer relief.281 Con-
tract law permits a consumer who has been defrauded or coerced
to defend herself if she is sued by the bad actor-so long as she can
find a lawyer and can afford to pay the hourly fees-so it provides
little help for those who have already paid, and does little to dis-
courage the bad actors, who at worst find themselves unable to
collect on a single contract. But that same consumer can bring a
DTPA claim on a contingency basis and recover multiple damages
and attorneys' fees. And this is only one remedy; state and federal
agencies of every sort-nearly all of which are better suited than
are nonspecialist judges to determine what kinds of practices
ought to be prohibited or regulated-are actively involved in pre-
venting precisely the same sort of unfair practices that contract
rule technique tries to govern.282
C. The Shape of Things to Come
There are two common views of the future. One is that it is like-
ly to be "much like the present, only longer."283 The other is that
"the only thing we know about the future is that it is going to be
different."28 Both, of course, are true: The future will be similar
to today, only different. The difficulty is determining where the
differences lie.
Looking forward over the coming decades, it is impossible, of
course, to tell precisely what will happen, but there are certain
trends that will very likely accelerate, and looming new technolo-
gies that may bring radical changes. Several of the trends we
identified earlier will probably continue. Contract cases will con-
tinue to flee the judicial system. The use of standardized con-
tracts and practices will keep growing. Globalization will reduce
variations in contracting practices around the world. The drive for
281. See G. Richard Shell, Substituting Ethical Standards for Common Law Rules in
Commercial Cases: An Emerging Statutory Trend, 82 Nw. U. L. REV. 1198 (1988) (describ-
ing growth of state deceptive trade practices acts as substitutes for common-law contract
restraints); Donald R. Stroud III, Comment, Beyond Deception: Finding Prudential Bound-
aries Between Breach of Contract and Deceptive Trade Practices Act Violations in Wiscon-
sin. 93 MARQ. L. REV. 1157, 1164 (2010) (noting how such acts allow courts to police sharp
dealing without relying on the specific terms of contracts).
282. A sample of the host of non-contractual remedies available to consumers with com-
plaints can be found at Consumer Protection, USA.GOv,
http://www.usa.gov/topics/consumer.shtml (last updated Mar. 31, 2014).
283. THE GIGANTIC BOOK OF BASEBALL QUOTATIONS 579 (Wayne Stewart & Roger Kahn
eds., 2007) (quoting Dan Quisenberry).
284. PETER DRUCKER, MANAGEMENT: TASKS, RESPONSIBILITIES, PRACTICES 44 (1973).
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efficient processes and improved quality in goods and services will
intensify. The view of contract disputes not as discrete legal mat-
ters but as a simple cost function within a larger system will gain
even more strength. This is in effect the present, only longer.
But there are also changes that will raise new issues and will
likely make our current contract law techniques even less ade-
quate. We mention only a few here, from the relatively simple to
the mind-bogglingly complex.
Nonlegal Self-Help Remedies. One of the striking features of the
past decade is the rise of various extralegal systems for consumer
self-help. The meteoric rise of social media on the Internet has
restored the concept of public shaming-once limited to insular
communities where reputation was particularly important-to a
prominent position. Traditionally, weaker parties who lacked the
resources to litigate in court often had no way to retaliate against
the stronger parties who they believed had breached their agree-
ments. Today, ubiquitous ratings systems on popular web sites,
sometimes with free and open (and often virulent) commentary,
allow individual consumers to extract a measure of vengeance on
the businesses that they believe have wronged them.285 Contract-
ing parties who once were able to view each customer as an isolat-
ed transaction, and who saw the harm of dissatisfaction as lim-
ited, now face a world in which a handful of disgruntled consum-
ers can seriously affect their reputations and their businesses.
Systems like these are today only in their infancy, but they will
doubtless play a substantial role in regulating commercial behav-
ior in the years to come.
Do-It-Yourself (DIY) Contracting. The days when it was difficult
for an ordinary person to be able to generate a sophisticated writ-
ten contract are quickly passing. Web sites like LegalZoom and
Rocket Lawyer have been providing DIY contracts for a few years
now, but the launch in 2013 of the Shake application for
smartphones marks such a huge step forward that one early re-
viewer titled his piece, "We (Lawyers) Just Got Replaced By a
Contract-Drafting App."286 Shake is a phone app that allows ordi-
nary people-small businesses, freelancers, buyers and sellers-to
285. See, e.g., Wayne R. Barnes, Social Media and the Rise in Consumer Bargaining
Power, 14 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 661 (2012) (noting rise in consumer self-help remedies using
social media).
286. William Peacock, We (Lawyers) Just Got Replaced By a Contract-Drafting App,
FINDLAW (Sept. 16, 2013), http://blogs.findlaw.com/technologist/2013/09/we-lawyers-just-
got-replaced-by-a-contract-drafting-app.html.
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generate surprisingly sophisticated contracts in a few moments
and to have them signed digitally on their devices. The spread of
such simple-to-use technologies means that even for small trans-
actions the parties will have written documentation of their prom-
ises, and the documentation will consist of standardized terms
developed over millions of transactions, not the often confusing
quasi-legalisms lay people often employ when writing "contract"
terms. The tools as presently designed are suitable for smaller
transactions. ShakeLaw, for example, advises using the product
for selling your computer on Craigslist, not for selling your com-
pany. But the products are likely to become more sophisticated as
designers and users gain experience.287
Spend Analysis and Integrated Source-to-Settle Procurement.
The very concept of contracting has changed in many cutting-edge
businesses. Instead of thousands of individual contracts that are
individually issued, monitored, paid, disputed, and resolved, most
businesses are aiming to integrate the sourcing of materials, com-
ponents, and labor.288 These procurement processes are governed
by highly detailed specifications that are designed to reduce varia-
tion and disputes, and to resolve matters efficiently. Modern sup-
ply chain management is aiming to do for the contracting process
what modern production techniques have done for manufacturing:
to eliminate human variance and resulting errors.
Big Data. People have used computers to process data for half a
century, but the idea of "big data"-the process of using artificial
intelligence to harvest insights from standard databases, click-
stream data from the Web, social network communications, sensor
data and surveillance data--only entered the popular lexicon a
few years ago. Yet in that short period we all now are beginning
to feel the effects of the "Age of Big Data."290 The sheer volume of
287. One leading firm already has a much more sophisticated free product available to
clients who are putting together term sheets for venture capital deals. See WSGR Term
Sheet Generator, WILSON, SONSINI, GOODRICH & ROSATI,
http://www.wsgr.com/wsgr/display.aspx?sectionname=practice/termsheet.htm (last visited
May 5, 2014).
288. See, e.g., KIRIT PANDIT, SPEND ANALYSIS: THE WINDOW INTO STRATEGIC SOURCING
(2008); FRED SOLLISH & JOHN SEMANIK, STRATEGIC GLOBAL SOURCING: BEST PRACTICES
(2011); FRED SOLLISH & JOHN SEMANIK, THE PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY MANAGER'S DESK
REFERENCE (2d ed. 2012).
289. Steve Lohr, Amid the Flood, A Catchphrase Is Born, NEW YORK TIMES, Aug. 12,
2012; Steve Lohr, The Age of Big Data, NEW YORK TIMES, Feb 11. 2012.
290. See Joshua Gruenspecht, "Reasonable" Grand Jury Subpoenas: Asking for Infor-
mation in the Age of Big Data, 24 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 543 (2011); Omer Tene & Jules Polo-
netsky, Privacy in the Age of Big Data: A Time for Big Decisions, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE
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data is mind-numbing; the total amount of digital information
available in 2013 was estimated at 4 ZB (zettabytes), or roughly
twenty-five times the sum total of all the information stored on all
the computer drives in the world in 2006. The 2013 figures are
nearly double those of 2012 and four times those of 2010.291 What
is more important is that with artificial intelligence this data can
be mined and put to use to predict not only behavior, but how dif-
ferent rules will affect behavior. Simply put, big data enables bet-
ter predictions, and better predictions yield better decisions. 29 2 If
the law, in Holmes's famous dictum, is nothing more than the pre-
diction of what results the judicial system will produce, 29 3 big data
will almost certainly yield better predictions than will the study of
appellate cases.294  As agreements and the outcomes of those
agreements are captured in databases, transactional lawyers will
better predict which language will reduce disputes, protect their
clients' interests, and yield the best results in the ultimate event
of a dispute. Judges and juries, instead of relying on gut instinct
and vague notions of "reasonable" contractual behavior will have
hard data as to what parties routinely do in any possible situation.
Big data looks to be the key to understanding and optimizing
business processes. Contracting is as much a business process as
manufacturing, marketing, and distribution, and it seems fair to
say that the impact of Big Data on how contracts are written, per-
formed, and interpreted will be substantial.
It is impossible to tell exactly what form these developments
will take, but together we believe that they will have an enormous
impact on the way commercial transactions are conducted and
thus will continue to eat away at our existing contract law tech-
nique.
63 (2012); Nicolas P. Terry, Protecting Patient Privacy in the Age of Big Data, 81 UMKC L.
REV. 385, 388 (2012); Neil M. Richards & Jonathan H. King, Three Paradoxes of Big Data,
66 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 41 (2013); Nolan M. Goldberg & Micah W. Miller, The Practice of
Law in the Age of "Big Data," NAT'L L.J. (Apr. 11, 2011),
http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202489457214.
291. Frank Gens, IDC Predictions 2013: Competing on the 3rd Platform, IDC (Nov.
2012), http://www.idc.com/researchlPredictionsl3/downloadable/238044.pdf.
292. Andrew McAfee & Erik Brynjolfsson, Big Data: The Management Revolution, HARV.
Bus. REV., Oct. 2012, at 60-67.
293. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 460-61
(1897).
294. See Daniel Martin Katz, Quantitative Legal Prediction-or-How I Learned to Stop
Worrying and Start Preparing for the Data-Driven Future of the Legal Services Industry, 62
EMORY L.J. 909 (2013).
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VI. IMPLICATIONS FOR "CONTRACTS" AS A SUBJECT
In this part of the paper we look at the implications of our pre-
vious observations on the legal subject traditionally called "Con-
tracts." What parts of the subject will likely still be important a
decade from now? Which parts will fall into desuetude? Which
parts, having outlived their usefulness, will linger on to inflict oc-
casional damages on the unwary? We believe that for the two
most important categories of contracting parties-consumers pur-
chasing from merchants (what businesses call business-to-
consumer or "B2C" transactions) and business engaged in mercan-
tile exchanges with other merchants (business-to-business or
"B2B"), the rules are worthless at best and pernicious at worst.
For consumers in an age of standardization there are three
problems with contemporary contract law. First, the time, ex-
pense, and uncertainty necessary in employing the contract tech-
nique mean that most consumers are priced out of the system.295
Even if the technique was useful in dealing with their claims, they
cannot afford to use it. Second, the great bulk of the technique is
simply irrelevant in consumer disputes over standardized prod-
ucts. Third, the technique does a remarkably bad job addressing
the three questions that are important to consumers: (a) to what
extent the consumer is bound to the merchant's standard form
terms; (b) what precisely those terms mean, and (c) in the absence
of a writing-as in the case of a purchase at a store-what obliga-
tions the merchant assumes. All are questions on which it is high-
ly desirable to get predictable, standardized answers that all con-
sumers can rely on, and yet our technique assigns them to be re-
solved case-by-case, leaving individual consumers at the whim of
the particular trial judge or jury.
As for merchants in B2B transactions, the technique is slightly
more relevant. There certainly are one-shot negotiated contracts
which fit the model assumed by the technique, so if we assume
that parties and their lawyers have done an unusually bad job in
the contracting process-or some other set of circumstances raises
295. The primary exceptions are the consumers who act as mascots in lawyer-driven
class action litigation, where potential settlement values make the litigation profitable and
provide rewards to the plaintiffs beyond their ordinary breach of contract remedies. But
the very existence of the class action remedy is an admission that the ordinary contract law
remedies for consumers are worthless. See, e.g., Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d
1100, 1106 (Cal. 2005) ("Individual actions by each of the defrauded consumers is often
impracticable because the amount of individual recovery would be insufficient to justify
bringing a separate action . . . .").
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an unusual question-resort to the courts will sometimes be nec-
essary. But this is a very small slice of the field of contractual
commercial transactions. To the extent that the technique has
any relevance in most transactions, it is as a hidden land mine
waiting to explode. In the modern world, rule technique is much
less a way of determining the parties' intent when evidence is
lacking, and more as a way of undermining written agreements
that have carefully been prepared by lawyers.29 6 Far from the
simple, clear, rational, and certain system that Karl Llewellyn
thought would help businesses and lawyers avoid problems and
plan carefully for the future,29 7 we have one that they are fleeing
like patrons from a burning theater.
In what follows, we will take a brief look at each of the basic
conceptual building blocks of contract rule technique-the subsets
of rules that make up the traditional subject-and give our
thoughts on how they will evolve or disappear in the years ahead.
A. Consideration
The consideration doctrine is what contract technique tradition-
ally uses to decide if the parties have made a bargained-for ex-
change (in which case they have a "contract" that courts will en-
force), or if they have done something else, such as made gratui-
tous promises or exchanged gifts. It is already the conventional
wisdom in the modern world that the doctrine is used chiefly in
contracts as a pedagogical tool rather than something that will
ever likely arise in practice.2 98 There are still rare cases where
296. Well-known modern cases include Nanakuli Paving & Rock Co. v. Shell Oil Co., 664
F.2d 772 (9th Cir. 1981) (using disputed trade usage testimony to override express, negoti-
ated price term in written contract); Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp., 97 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir.
1996) (mangling rules of interpretation to hold that employees who had expressly declined
certain benefits had nevertheless contracted for them); Nora Beverages, Inc. v. Perrier
Group of America, Inc., 164 F.3d 736 (2d Cir.1998) (finding buyer who had not agreed on
either quantities or length of the agreement and who had not signed contract was bound
anyway). Prominent cases that involve similar but less successful attempts to avoid explic-
it and very carefully drafted language include AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct.
1740 (2011) Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991); Hill v. Gateway
2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997).
297. Ingrid Michelsen Hillinger, The Article 2 Merchant Rules: Karl Llewellyn's Attempt
to Achieve the Good, the True, the Beautiful in Commercial Law, 73 GEO. L.J. 1141, 1146-47
(1985). "Llewellyn believed businessmen needed rules on which they could rely, rules that
would produce predictable results. The existence of predictable rules would make commer-
cial activity more rational and would thereby encourage its expansion." Id. at 1147.
298. "With luck," write the authors of a leading contract law casebook, "you will be able
to practice years without ever seeing a contract that lacks consideration, since nearly all
commercial contracts and most non-commercial ones involve reciprocal, bargained-for
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doctrine plays a role, and a few more where it is manipulated by
courts to achieve a desired result that cannot be justified on other
grounds, but as an important part of the technique its days are
over.299
B. Reliance
The primary alternative to consideration-based contract theory
is the piece of doctrine known historically as "promissory estoppel"
and more commonly today as "reliance." Reliance is a concept lift-
ed from tort (where it is an element of the tort of fraud) and equity
jurisprudence (from whence the terminology was taken), which
imposes liability without regard to bargain. In other words, a
promise can become enforceable, even if the promisor does not in-
tend it to be such, if the promisee relies on it. At one point, as we
noted at the beginning of this paper, it seemed poised to swallow
up contract law whole. That did not happen, for a variety of rea-
sons."oo But while reliance ultimately did not conquer, it left
enough of itself around to create substantial problems for the un-
wary.
Over the coming years, whatever little justification reliance ever
had as a theory is likely to disappear. The drive to standardize
contracting processes and make them efficient and predictable
requires a system that allows firms to determine the extent to
which their contracts will be legally enforceable before they begin
performance. A reliance system, like a tort system, is inherently
unpredictable because liabilities cannot be reliably ascertained
until after the event happens. In tort the threat of substantial ex
post liability is sensible, because we want to deter parties from
engaging in the kind of activity that might harm others. But the
point of contract law is to encourage commercial transactions, not
promises." BRUCE W. FRIER & JAMES J. WHITE, THE MODERN LAW OF CONTRACTS 33 (3d ed.
2012).
299. See James D. Gordon III, A Dialogue About the Doctrine of Consideration, 75
CORNELL L. REV. 987, 1006 (1990) ("Perhaps someday contract law will more closely reflect
common sense and modern commercial practice, business people will not have to seek legal
advice reflecting irrational rules from centuries long past.").
300. One in particular is that enforcement based on reliance quickly becomes circular.
Traditionally, it was reasonable to rely something identifiable as a "contract" because
courts would enforce it if the other party reneged. The new approach turned that on its
head, finding that any promise might create was a "contract" if the other party reasonably
relied on it. In the 19th century, one relied on a promise that one expected the state to
enforce; in the 20th, the state enforced a promise on which one relied. Shortly after the
doctrine reached fully iconic status with its inclusion as § 90 of the Second Restatement,
courts begin backing away from it. See note 10, supra.
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to deter them, and a reliance regime that makes liability depend-
ent not on the agreement but on unpredictable conduct of the oth-
er party is antithetical to that. The lingering remains of the doc-
trine only encourage further exodus from the courts to arbitration
and the continuing decline of contract technique.
C. Formation
The contract formation principles embedded in the technique-
which make up fifty-three of the 385 sections of the Second Re-
statement-can for our purposes be divided into three broad parts.
The first is the doctrinally important dance of offer, acceptance,
rejection, revocation, counter-offer, and so on, which makes up the
bulk of the relevant doctrine, but in practice is largely irrelevant.
The second is the practically important treatment of how standard
form contracts are made and enforced, with which the doctrine
hardly engages at all. The third is the confusing question of when
parties who anticipate signing written agreements may be bound
before they sign them, which is practically dangerous and doctri-
nally a mere hash.
The great bulk of the Second Restatement's treatment of for-
mation is made up of the first category, including such well-known
doctrinal chestnuts as the "mailbox rule" and the "overtaking ac-
ceptance" and such peculiar one-shot cases as Adams v. Lindsellor
(what happens when you mail the offer to the wrong address?) and
Dickerson v. Dodds30 2 (at what point does the offeror's repeated
attempts to avoid you indicate that an offer has been withdrawn?).
Most of them seem to reflect the quaint problems of a bygone
world, as can be seen by the titles of many: "Necessity That Mani-
festations Have Reference to Each Other"; " "To Whom an Offer Is
Addressed";304 "Form of Acceptance Invited"; * "Methods of Ter-
mination of the Power of Acceptance";306 "Indirect Communication
of Revocation";307 "Purported Acceptance Which Adds Qualifica-
tions";os "Effect of Performance by Offeree Where Offer Invites
301. 106 ER 250 (KB. 1818).
302. 2 Ch. Div. 463 (1876).
303. REST. 2D, supra note 90, § 23.
304. Id. § 29.
305. Id. § 30.
306. Id. § 36.
307. Id. § 43.
308. Id. § 59.
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Either Performance or Promise";09 "Reasonableness of Medium of
Acceptance"; o "Effect of Receipt of Acceptance Improperly Dis-
patched";' and "Effect of Receipt by Offeror of a Late or Other-
wise Defective Acceptance."312 These reflect a world in which most
contracts are made by individual one-to-one correspondence on
individualized terms. But the world of tomorrow, as we note
above, is one where contracting is dominated by supply chain
management, source-to-settle procurement, master supply agree-
ments, online purchasing, standardized service contracts, in-store
retail sales, machine-to-machine or machine-to-person ordering,
and even by sophisticated written agreements prepared by con-
sumers and microbusinesses on smartphones. There will be clear,
standardized written documents to which parties have clearly in-
dicated agreement, leaving little scope for the elaborate dance of
offer-and-acceptance and its doctrinal subtleties.313
The second, and much more important issue in contract for-
mation, is the one that the doctrine paradoxically ignores. There
are many important and contentious issues involving the question
of when a party manifests consent to standard terms,314 but no
answers will be found in the current technique." The rules are
not designed for current situations. "Mutual assent" simply re-
quires "that each party either make a promise or begin or render a
performance,"" but the tough question is whether downloading a
coupon or clicking "like" on a Facebook page should be counted as
"promise" or a "performance," and guidance on this issue is entire-
ly lacking. Nothing in current rule technique suggests any meth-
309. Id. § 62.
310. Id. § 65.
311. Id. § 67.
312. Id. § 70.
313. We are not saying that there will be no cases in the future where rules like this
might have to be resorted to. There is probably no body of law, however arcane, that does
not need to be dredged up from time to time to deal with unusual cases. But as a part of
rule technique, it is headed toward desuetude.
314. As these words are being written, the Internet is ablaze over the issue whether
merely visiting a web site, clicking "like" on a social media board, or downloading a coupon
is "assent" to standard terms that the seller has posted somewhere. See Stephanie Strom,
When Liking' a Brand Online Voids the Right to Sue, N.Y. TIMES, April 16, 2014, at Bl;
Stephanie Strom, General Mills Reverses Itself on Consumers' Right to Sue, N.Y. Times,
April 20, 2014 at A17.
315. The concept of standard-form contracts is almost entirely absent from the formation
sections; the only place in the Second Restatement that it bubbles to the surface enough to
be noticed is in connection with the parol evidence rule. See text at note 298, infra.
316. REST. 2D, supra note 90, § 18.
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odology for providing intelligent answers."' It is of obvious im-
portance that both businesses and consumers be able to under-
stand clearly what counts as assent and what that assent means.
Doubtless such rules will be developed in the coming decade, but
they will almost certainly come from regulatory agencies, not from
courts relying on contract technique.
The third important area of formation doctrine is the body of
rules regarding when parties are bound to contracts before they
have formally signified their assent. Most lay people-and proba-
bly most business people-have a "Big Bang"3 18 view of contract:
liability attaches when the party "signs on the dotted line." Eve-
rything before that point is negotiation, while everything thereaf-
ter carries legal liability. But contract technique reflects the op-
posite rule. The default position is that the contract is formed
when "manifestations of assent" are exchanged during discussions,
and that a contract will be found unless "the circumstances show"
that the parties did not intend to be bound until the writing was
signed.' This approach rests upon the observation that parties
"necessarily discuss the proposed terms of the contract before they
enter into it and often, before the final writing is made, agreeing
upon all the terms which they plan to incorporate therein."320 This
is doubtless true-it is difficult to imagine a situation in which
parties have neither talked about nor generally agreed to terms
before they are asked to sign a written agreement-but that is not
the question. The question is whether the law should enforce the
alleged oral promises (which will doubtless involve the conflicting
317. It may seem unfair to criticize the technique for failing to come to grips with the
intricacies of modern internet commerce. Law necessarily is always behind the technology
curve, and the drafter of the Second Restatement, for example, can hardly be faulted for not
foreseeing such phenomena as internet commerce. Yet standard-form contracts have been
important, and known by legal scholars to be important, for well over half a century. The
problems raised by internet commerce are not much different from those raised by technol-
ogies-such as door-to-door sales, direct marketing, catalogue sales, and telemarketing-
that have been employed for at least that long. As long ago as the Second World War
scholars were criticizing the fact that the contemporary doctrine did not deal adequately
with standard forms. See, e.g., Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts
About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629 (1943) (noting that "our common law of
standardized contracts is highly contradictory and confusing, and the potentialities inher-
ent in the common law system for coping with contracts of adhesion have not been fully
developed").
318. The term is from Jeff C. Dodd, Essay, Time and Assent in the Formation of Infor-
mation Contracts: The Mischief of Applying Article 2 to Information Contracts, 36 HOUS. L.
REV. 195 (1999).
319. REST. 2D, supra note 90, § 27.
320. Id. cmt. a.
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testimony of the two parties long after the fact) or simply wait un-
til there is a signed agreement. In the days when preparing the
written agreement was a costly and cumbersome procedure and
parties routinely began performing before anything was signed,
the rule may have made some sense. Today, the rule exists mere-
ly to trip up parties who are not sophisticated enough to make the
proper disclaimers at the beginning of negotiations. As such, it is
yet another hazard for those who are trying to use contract law to
achieve some predictability in commercial transactions.
D. Writing Requirements
We have noted previously that the arcane rules involving the
statute of frauds and the parol evidence rule are relics of the days
when writings were rare and carried substantial value. Paradoxi-
cally, however, the very ubiquity of written agreements may make
the requirements and effects of writings even more important. To
be at all useful, however, the technique will have to change sub-
stantially.
In the days when the vast majority of contracts were oral, it
made sense for certain types of contracts-those particularly sus-
ceptible to fraud and abuse-to be in writing before they would be
enforced.321 Hence, the writing requirements known collectively as
the statute of frauds were created. These statutes were never
popular with judges, and over time became "riddled with excep-
tions."322 The result is a mess which manages simultaneously to
make planning less certain and to drive up the cost of ultimate
litigation. There are two obvious ways to get rid of the mess. One
is simply abolishing the statute of frauds, as the United Kingdom
did in 1954.323 The other is to require the writing and eliminate
the encrusted exceptions. Predictability would likely be enhanced
and litigation costs reduced by the latter-a simple rule that if it
321. These included most of the kinds of contracts that the ruling elites of England in
the late 17th century would find troublesome: contracts for sales of jealously hoarded fami-
ly land; promises by heads of the family to pay the debts of poor relations, either live (as
sureties) or deceased (as executors); promises allegedly made in the course of carefully
arranged dynastic marriages; and contracts with tenants and servants who claimed their
contracts were longer than the customary one year.
322. Ronald K. L. Collins & David M. Skover, Paratexts, 44 STAN. L. REV. 509, 532-33
(1992). A good account of the various exceptions is found in JOHN EDWARD MURRAY, JR.,
MURRAY ON CONTRACTS §§ 75-81 (5th ed. 2011).
323. Id. at 33.
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is not in writing, it isn't enforceable-but the point is that which-
ever solution is adopted, this part of the technique is irrelevant.
The same problems plague the issues of parol evidence in con-
tracts. The basic rule is that where parties have a writing that
sets out the terms of their agreement, they will not be allowed to
introduce outside testimony to show that the deal was something
other than what was included in the writing. Like the statute of
frauds, the parol evidence rule is so infested with limitations and
exceptionS324 that it serves as little more than a vehicle for driving
up legal fees in litigation.3 25 Again, the only two apparent solu-
tions are keeping the rule and eliminating the exceptions or elimi-
nating the rule and allowing all writings to be contradicted by
outside testimony in all cases. In a world of ubiquitous and care-
fully crafted writings, eliminating the exceptions and giving con-
clusive effect to the written terms is probably the better course.
But whichever course is ultimately adopted, this part of the tech-
nique will likely wither.
E. Defenses
Current technique has developed two broad categories of de-
fenses to contract formation: defenses said to go to the quality of
the mutual assent, and those derived from public policy. The for-
mer include duress, undue influence, fraud, misrepresentation,
nondisclosure, mutual mistake, and unilateral mistake, the pres-
ence of which will make a contract unenforceable due to lack of
"consent." The latter include contracts that are illegal, are contra-
ry to public policy, or seem to be "unconscionable" to the judge.
These contracts are unenforceable even if the parties knowingly
consented to them. Both categories date to the days when most
contracts were negotiated face-to-face, and refusing to enforce a
tainted contract was the state's only tool for reaching socially
harmful activities like coercion, fraud, and high-pressure sales.
Today few contracts involve the kind of face-to-face situations
involving relatively high stakes where duress and undue influence
might possibly be employed. To the extent these tactics are used
324. See id. § 86.
325. To show that the parol evidence rule should not apply in a particular case, a party
must produce and the other party must defend against the same evidence that would come
in if there were no such rule. In fact, costs are often increased because the parties must
battle over the same evidence twice, once at the stage of admissibility and once again at
trial.
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by merchants, there exists a bevy of much more effective tools for
consumers and regulators to reach the bad conduct.32 6 These tools
include explicit consumer protection regimes and even criminal
prosecutions. Fraud, misrepresentation, and nondisclosure, on the
other hand, obviously can flourish in a world of mass transactions,
but the problem is that individual one-shot non-enforcement of the
resulting contracts is perhaps the least effective way of dealing
with the problem, because most of the defrauded will likely pay
up rather than endure the costs and uncertainties of litigation.
These undesirable practices seem to be precisely the sort of thing
that consumer agencies with fact-finding procedures and regulato-
ry authority should address on a mass basis. It is likely that there
would be very little effect-except for a reduction in uncertainty
and litigation costs-if all of these defenses were removed from
contract law and the issues handled by competent regulatory bod-
ies.
The issues are different with respect to public policy defenses.
These involve situations in which the legislature has not prohibit-
ed particular agreements, but courts on their own decide that the
activity should be barred. In many cases, the issue is not whether
a particular agreement is contrary to public policy, but whether
judges or legislatures get to decide what that policy is. By far the
most common areas where courts invoke public policy concerns
relate to: (1) employee covenants not to compete,327 (2) employee
and consumer arbitration agreements,328 (3) failure to comply
with regulatory licensing requirements,329 (4) clauses that limit
liability for negligence or other harm,330 and (5) agreements relat-
ing to family relationships.331 Each of these involves issues that
are remarkably unsuited for resolution on a case-by-case basis
based on vague factors of the "public policy." They are ideally
suited for legislative or administrative resolution. If legislatures
and regulatory authorities have not barred certain types of con-
326. Private coercion or undue influence in family-related transactions-such as the
quintessential case of the care-giver who pressures an elderly relative to change her will-
will still arise and certainly will need to be dealt with, but that can be done without over-
arching contract doctrines like duress and undue influence. Family and probate courts
presumably are the better venues for dealing with such problems.
327. See, e.g., Valley Medical Specialists v. Farber, 194 Ariz. 363, 982 P.2d 1277 (en banc
1999).
328. See, e.g., Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1106 (Cal. 2005).
329. See, e.g., U.S. Nursing Corp. v. Saint Joseph Medical Ctr., 842 F. Supp. 1103 (N.D.
Ill. 1994).
330. See, e.g., Hanks v. Powder Ridge Restaurant Corp., 885 A.2d 734 (Conn. 2005).
331. See, e.g., Hewitt v. Hewitt, 77 Ill. 2d 49, 394 N.E.2d 1204 (1979).
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tracts, judicial invalidation on an ad hoc after-the-fact basis pro-
vides little regulatory effect-ski slopes still put negligence dis-
claimers in their contracts even when courts have found them in-
valid, and consumers continue to believe that they are enforcea-
ble-and adds significant uncertainty and cost to the process.
There is little likelihood that a technique appropriate for the fu-
ture would assign this task to the courts enforcing contracts.
F. Interpretation
It is ordinarily not difficult in contracts to determine what the
contract language means. But because language is an imperfect
tool, questions arise with some frequency about exactly what a
contract requires. Thus, contract technique necessarily must deal
with issues of contract interpretation. The problem is that the
technique historically has focused on what these particular parties
meant when they used particular language. That may have been
a plausible approach when contracting was local, usage was idio-
syncratic, and the tools for crafting clear written documents were
unavailable, but it makes little sense in a world where the very
language of business is, as we noted above, being standardized.
Courts and legal scholars for years have pointed out, quite cor-
rectly, that the plain meaning of a written agreement may not
necessarily reflect what the parties actually agreed. Where they
have erred is assuming that courts routinely should try to enforce
the latter - the underlying intentions-rather than the former-
the actual agreement. In the world to come, the pressure for
standardization means that words must acquire meanings that
are reliable and predictable, and parties must assume responsibil-
ity for using them correctly. For example, a manufacturing pro-
cess for a product designed to work in complex systems must con-
form exactly to what is required. A manufacturer whose products
do not meet the specifications will suffer. Similarly, we expect
that the contracting parties of the future will take on the respon-
sibility of using precise language.
This is particularly true given that standardized contracts are
used for mass transactions. It is highly desirable that the same
term used in contracts by two separate suppliers be interpreted in
the same way, and that it be interpreted the same way in every
court in the United States. It would also be helpful if ordinary
words in a cell phone contract and a construction contract were
held to have the same meaning, so that unsophisticated buyers
who have experience with one are not led astray by the other.
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There will be increasing pressure for standardized agreements to
converge, so that clauses that have proven clear and effective su-
persede those that are less so. But this process can only proceed if
courts are willing to adhere to a concept of plain meaning that
puts the onus on the parties, and not the judge, to specify what is
meant.
These changes will likely require wholesale scuttling of the
whole body of doctrine relating to trade usage. Where commerce
is global and transactions among merchants in the same kind of
goods is the exception rather than the rule, a system that leaves a
party free to argue that 49.5 percent counts as "at least" 50 per-
cent332 invites confusion and wasted transactional costs at best,
and abuse and sharp dealing at worst.
G. Performance and Breach
Once the terms of the contract are determined, the key question
in a contract dispute usually becomes whether the parties have
done what they were supposed to do. If they did not, there is a
breach. Unlike many of the other parts of contract technique, this
is actually a factual question that necessarily must often be decid-
ed on a case-by-case basis. Determining exactly what was re-
quired and exactly what a party has done are questions that can
only be answered after a full factual hearing. Determining facts
like this is one of the things that the judicial system is reasonably
good at doing. But current technique goes far beyond this
straightforward task. There are two particularly pernicious doc-
trines.
1. Substantial Performance
The doctrine of "substantial performance" allows (even requires)
judges to second-guess the parties and determine not whether the
party has done what it promised, but whether it has done what the
other party needs. Determining whether the party has done what
it promised is a straight factual inquiry. Determining what the
other party needs, on the other hand, invites judges who are often
unfamiliar with commercial practices to remake the parties' bar-
gain based upon subsequent self-serving evidence produced by the
parties long after the fact. It is possible that at the time the doc-
332. Cf. Hurst v. W. J. Lake & Co., 16 P.2d 627 (Ore. 1932).
408 Vol. 52
The Death of Contracts
trine first developed, judges and juries were able to determine, at
least roughly, whether the value of a house was affected by the
brand of pipe put in the walls of a residence.333 But in the world of
today-and still less of tomorrow-how can we expect a single
judge supported by half a dozen lay people to determine whether a
contractor whose human resources software installation has failed
to comply with certain contract specifications is "close enough" to
what was ordered to require the other party to pay?
Eliminating the doctrine of substantial performance would in-
crease predictability and eliminate litigation costs. It would also
have very little effect on parties for whom "close enough" actually
is good enough. A party who wants to be paid even though it has
installed the wrong brand of product can protect itself by inserting
a clause that says "or equivalent." Parties are free to include
clauses that allow them to be paid even though there are defects.
If parties choose not to indicate when they will be happy to agree
to something less than what was bargained for, it is difficult to see
why courts should bail them out, especially when it adds substan-
tial transaction costs to the process.
2. Impracticability and Frustration
The second troublesome piece of the technique is the body of
doctrine usually called "impracticability and frustration of pur-
pose." One of the key functions of contract is to allocate the un-
known risks that lie in the future. Often, when the bets turn out
badly, and either the cost of performance has drastically risen, or
the value of the reciprocal performance has sunk, a party wants to
get out of the deal. The party argues that performance is now
"impracticable," or that the return promise is so worthless that the
purpose of the contract is "frustrated."
Obviously, there are two broad categories of contracting parties.
The first is made up of those who are deliberately using contracts
to allocate risks-e.g., in a fluctuating market, specifying delivery
of certain goods at a certain price in the future. It is critical to
these parties that they get exactly what they bargained for, no
matter how impracticable or frustrating it appears to the other
party. The second is made up of those for whom that level of
strictness is not required. It is relatively easy to tell these two
categories of contracting parties apart. The second group routine-
333. See Jacob & Youngs v. Kent, N.Y. 239, 129 N.E. 889 (N.Y. 1921).
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ly includes force majeure clauses which allow parties to back out of
the deal in the event of certain unforeseen problems like natural
disasters, wars, shortages of raw materials, labor troubles, new
government regulations, and so on. Where these clauses are part
of the contract, courts should certainly give them full effect. But
the first group, which specifies precise performance and does not
provide for the disaster scenarios, ought to get what it bargained
for. In a world where adding a force majeure clause is as simple as
clicking a button on a smartphone, there seems little reason for
courts to add another layer of difficulty for parties trying to en-
force their agreements.
H. Capacity
Capacity to contract is an important concept, but it has very lit-
tle practical significance in the contemporary world. Today it is
relevant to only two classes of people, infants (people under the
legal contracting age) and the mentally infirm. Neither group
makes up a sizeable slice of actual contract litigation. As for in-
fants, they engage in billions of dollars in commercial transactions
daily.334 Most of these are relatively small standardized transac-
tions for goods and services and are virtually never litigated.
Where there is litigation, it often seems to take the form of quasi-
consumer-protection litigation, as courts rely on the doctrine to
knock out particular provisions of contracts that seem unfair.335
As for the mentally infirm, the issue of competence is raised rela-
tively infrequently and is rarely successful. This is, in our view,
probably because the doctrine generally does not provide relief if
the transaction is on fair terms, the other party does not know of
the infirmity, and it has already been performed.' In a world of
anonymous transactions on standardized terms, there will be rela-
tively few situations where one party is actually in a position to
exploit knowledge of the other's mental defect.3 As standardiza-
334. See, e.g., $211 Billion and So Much to Buy- American Youths, the New Big Spend-
ers, HARRIS INTERACTIVE (Oct. 26, 2011),
http://www.harrisinteractive.com/NewsRoom/PressReleases/tabid/446/ctl/ReadCustom%20
Default/mid/1506/Articleld/896/Default.aspx.
335. See, e.g., Ex parte Odem, 537 So.2d 919 (Ala. 1988) (holding that a minor was
bound to pay for medical expenses incurred for her own minor child, but that she was not
bound to specific provisions of the hospital contract that required her to pay the hospital's
lawyers).
336. See REST. 2D, supra note 75, § 15.
337. One situation where there is still some scope for the doctrine to operate is in set-
tlements of personal injury claims where the victim claims the other party took advantage
410 Vol. 52
The Death of Contracts
tion of processes and terms increases, the importance of the given
individual's mental state is likely to decline.
L Damages
As we have noted above, the manner in which contract tech-
nique assesses damages is anachronistic. Legal scholars, applying
the arcane set of rules, find it difficult to answer such simple ques-
tions as how much money a retail boat dealer loses if a customer
backs out of a contract.338 Thus, the assumption that this is sim-
ple for untrained lay people to figure out is probably misplaced.
Outside the judicial system, parties in mediation and arbitration
rely on the same kinds of sophisticated financial tools that any
modern company uses to model and forecast its probable future,
and have them evaluated by financial experts who can understand
what they are being told. To the extent that the current technique
allows for the wild range of speculative amounts that are inherent
in the jury system, contracting parties will continued to prefer to
opt out of the technique and the courts.
CONCLUSION
In this paper we have been critical of contemporary contract
technique and pessimistic about the role it will play in the future.
But there are silver linings in this. First, contract law-like equi-
ty jurisprudence-is dying as a separate subject in part because
issues that once were part of contract law have now become entire-
ly new and distinct bodies of law, while other issues are sprouting.
Regimes that mix the classic private-ordering orientation of con-
tract law with a distinctive regulatory overlay have blossomed in
areas as distinct as employment law, noted above, and closely held
business enterprises.' To the extent that contract law is dying, it
has given birth to new sprigs in other disciplines.
of a mental infirmity. But even here, most claimants seem to lose. See, e.g., Marston v.
United States, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 141459 (D. Mass. Sept, 30, 2012) (finding worker who
suffered on-the-job brain damage to have been competent to sign settlement agreement);
Adsit v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 912 N.Y.S.2d 314 (Sup. Ct. App. Div. 2010) (finding injury
victim who became light-headed when her oxygen tank stopped working during settlement
discussions was nevertheless competent).
338. The permutations are set out in Melvin A. Eisenberg, Conflicting Formulas for
Measuring Expectation Damages, 45 ARIz. ST. L.J. 369 (2013).
339. See, e.g., Del. Code § 18-1101 ("It is the policy of this chapter to give the maximum
effect to the principle of freedom of contract and to the enforceability of limited liability
company agreements."); Myron T. Steele, Freedom of Contract and Default Contractual
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Second, there are, in our view, a few areas described below
where contract law-though probably not in its current form-will
likely play a very important role in the years to come. That is the
good news. The bad news is that these areas play very little role
in the current contracts curriculum, and are unlikely to gain much
traction in the years ahead. Still, whether this work is done inside
contract technique or in some outside system of private ordering,
these four areas will be important:
o Standardization of Agreements. Lawyers are not the de-
signers or architects of contracts; instead they are the engi-
neers and construction workers who carry out the vision of
the contracting parties. Those who are responsible for build-
ing and ensuring the safety of the airy skyscraper design,
inked by architects, have developed standardized practices
and procedures that help ensure that the structure does what
it is intended to do.3 ' Those who are responsible for creating
the master agreements that will dominate the world of tomor-
row are similarly in a position to develop agreements that are
clear, efficient, and predictable. Pairing sophisticated legal
judgment with modern technology offers the chance to create
a world in which the same clause in the same contract means
the same thing everywhere in the world. Part of this will be
the critical function of standardizing contract language, so
that contracting parties can reliably know in advance what
they are agreeing to.
o Transaction Engineering. In a world where more and more
transactions, involving larger and larger sums, will be stand-
ardized, the ones that are not will be become even more im-
portant. The success of a major deal relies on many things,
both tangible and intangible, but the terms of the contract can
be critical to the venture. This is another area where sophis-
ticated legal knowledge and cutting-edge technology can be
used to improve the process, yet relatively few scholars in the
field of law even focus on this as a field of study, and even
fewer law schools offer the kind of training that will be need-
Duties in Delaware Limited Partnerships and Limited Liability Companies, 46 AM. BUS.
L.J. 221 (2009).
340. The manner in which builders use standardized, reliable process to translate the
most innovative ideas into solid, practical buildings that do not collapse is outlined in ATUL
GAWANDE, THE CHECKLIST MANIFESTO 48-71 (2009).
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ed to engineer deals in the future. The chief assist that con-
ventional contract technique can lend this process is to try to
keep out of the way.
o Contracting System Design. The growth of business-to-
business contracting systems will only accelerate in the years
ahead. Based on their training, lawyers are uniquely posi-
tioned to be able to imagine the areas of potential problems in
advance, and to develop appropriate solutions. This will re-
quire a body of highly trained lawyers who are also technical-
ly competent to be involved in building these systems.
o Contract Assembly Software. The world is moving to one
where every individual transaction can be embodied in a well-
drafted tangible agreement that the parties can rely on in
planning for and carrying out their obligations. This will re-
quire not only the technological skills to allow for easy and
simple assembly, but also the technical legal skill and judg-
ment of lawyers involved in developing these programs. This
is a particularly fertile area that few law schools are explor-
ing.
The world of contract technique has had a dizzying run, from its
birth at the dawn of the nineteenth century to it approaching ex-
tinction in the coming decades. It has helped to build one of the
greatest engines of freedom and economic growth in history, and
has contributed substantially to the development of the modern
American state. The law owes a good deal to the traditional body
of law known as "contracts," as much, perhaps, as it owes to the
traditional body of law known as "equity jurisprudence." But nei-
ther independent body of law will likely be relevant to lawyers
working a decade hence.
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